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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FoURTH AMENDMENT-
THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
I.
INTRODUCTION.
Prior to June 18, 1961, twenty-six states excluded evidence obtained.
by an unreasonable search and seizure.' The following day fifty states
excluded evidence so obtained. The reason for this radical change was
the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
Mapp v. Ohio.2 Speaking through Mr. Justice Clark, the Court held that
evidence acquired by a search and seizure in violation of the Constitution,
is inadmissible in a state court. The purpose of this comment is to. de-
lineate and analyze the principles which have been established by the federal
courts in construing the fourth amendment~a (This is not intended to
imply, however, that the Court expressly decided that federal standards
of reasonableness are binding upon the states; this question has yet to be
decided, and those addressing themselves to this issue are not in accord. aa)
A number of pre-Mapp cases from exclusionary jurisdictions outside the
federal system will also be discussed in order to illustrate principles upon
which no federal case law has been found, or for the purpose of examining
particular fact situations. This comment will in no way attempt to evaluate
the arguments for and against the exclusionary rule, or to discuss its
history or development.4
The fourth amendment and its companion, the exclusionary rule,
protect the individual's right of privacy by creating a barrier between the
citizen and the police which can be surmounted only by certain prescribed
1. Appendix to Opinion of the Court, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
224-25, 80 Sup. Ct. 1437, 1448 (1960).
2. 367 U.S. 643, 81 Sup. Ct. 1684 (1961).
3. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized". U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
3a. See infra note 152 et seq.
4. The reader is advised, however, in order to better understand the exclu-
sionary rule, to trace its development and expansion through Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524 (1886); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34
Sup. Ct. 341 (1914); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 Sup. Ct. 1359 (1949);
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 Sup. Ct. 205 (1952); Irvine v. California,
347 U.S. 128, 74 Sup. Ct. 381 (1954); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 80 Sup.
Ct. 1431 (1960) ; Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 Sup. Ct. 1437 (1960).
(407)
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methods. Whether the police are ignorant of these methods (which is to
be doubted), or do not fully comprehend them (which is possible), or
merely forget them (either by choice or because of the exigency of the
moment), one thing is unfortunately obvious: in many jurisdictions there
have been more violations of, than compliance with, the constitutional
mandate. 5 Of course, it may very well be true that often there has in fact
been no violation; rather the court has misconstrued or misinterpreted
the law.6 No matter upon whose shoulders the responsibility for the present
state of affairs should fall, the fact remains that in this area of the law there
is a lack of instructive material. It is hoped that what follows will help
to fill this vacuum.
II.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE PURSUANT TO A SEARCH WARRANT.
It is axiomatic that a search and seizure conducted pursuant to a
valid search warrant renders the property seized admissible at the trial
if the customary rules of evidence are satisfied.7 The obvious inquiry is,
therefore, what is required for a valid (in the constitutional sense) search
warrant? The Constitution s prescribes the following requirements: (1)
the premises to be searched be particularly described, (2) the things to be
seized also be particularly described, and (3) the affiant swear or affirm
that he has probable cause to believe the specific property is on the premises
and give the reasons for this belief. For definitional purposes, a search
warrant is an order in writing, in the name of the state, signed by an
authorized judicial officer, directing a peace officer to search for, and
seize, the property listed, on the premises named.9
A.
The Requirement of Probable Cause.
The most troublesome area of the law of search and seizure is the
concept of "probable cause."' 0 In Dumbra v. United States, the Supreme
Court stated:
5. In 1950, in 4,673 out of 6,649 cases in one branch of the Chicago Municipal
Court having jurisdiction over lesser criminal offenses, the legality of securing the
evidence was put in issue. In 4,593 of these cases the motion to suppress the evidence
was granted. These statistics are even more astounding in view of the fact that
this was almost thirty years after Illinois adopted the exclusionary rule. Comment,
Search and Seizure in Illinois; Enforcement of the Constitutional Right of Privacy,
47 Nw. U.L. Riv. 493, 497 (1952).
6. "In looking into the law of search and seizure our expectations are realized:
it is an area in which bad law abounds". White, The Exclusionary Rule in the
American Law of Search and Seizure, 52 J.*CRIM. L., C., & P.S. 246 (1961).
7. This statement assumes that the search was conducted in a reasonable
manner and the property seized is such as is subject to seizure. These qualifications
will be discussed later in this comment.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, supra note 3.
9. CORNELIUS, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 340 (2d ed. 1930).
10. In Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124, 128, 53 Sup. Ct. 38, 40 (1932)
the Court stated that probable cause exists where the facts would lead a man of
[VOL. 7
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On determining what is probable cause we are not called upon to
determine whether the offense charged has in fact been committed.
We are concerned only with the question whether the affiant has
reasonable grounds at the time of his affidavit and the issuance of
the warrant for the belief that the law was being violated on the
premises to be searched, and if the apparent facts set out in the affidavit
are such that a reasonably discreet and prudent man would be led to
believe that there was a commission of the offense charged, there is
probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant.'
It is important to note that the judicial officer issuing the search
warrant is the one who must be satisfied that there is probable cause.
Therefore, merely submitting an affidavit stating that there are narcotics
in a certain dwelling cannot support a warrant to search said dwelling
house, and a search under such a warrant is a violation of the fourth
amendment. 12 The affiant must state the reasons for his belief that
narcotics are in this house, and the magistrate must find that there is
probable cause for this belief.'3 Naturally, each case must stand on its own
facts in determining whether or not probable cause has been established.' 4
Initially, the Supreme Court ruled that a search warrant could issue
only upon evidence which would be competent at the trial of the offense,'3
but it is now clear that the affiant need not rely purely on matters within
his own knowledge, without benefit of hearsay, to establish probable cause.
In Jones v. United States,'3 the Court held that an affidavit is not in-
sufficient to support a search warrant simply because it is based on
hearsay, as long as there is a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.17
Probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant must exist
at the time the warrant is sought, and the fact that it may have existed
prudence and caution to believe that the offense has been committed. In Note,
Probable Cause in Searches and Seizures, 3 ST. Louis U.L.J. 36, 37 (1954) it is
said: "The phrase probable cause refers to just that finding by a magistrate upon the
sworn statement of facts before him that there is sufficient evidence to believe that a
crime has been committed, and committed by the person charged or on the premises
described'. For further definition see infra. note 41.
11. 268 U.S. 435, 441, 45 Sup. Ct. 546, 549 (1925).
12. In Hagen v. United States, 4 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1925), the affidavit stated
that defendant was in possession of liquor in violation of the Prohibition Act, and a
search warrant was issued. On appeal the court held that the affidavit was insufficient
to support the issuance of a search warrant since not a fact was set forth which
tended to show probable cause actually existed. In Veeder v. United States, 252
Fed. 414 (7th Cir. 1918), cert. denied, 247 U.S. 200, 38 Sup. Ct. 428 (1918),
the affidavit upon which a search warrant was issued stated that affiant "has good
reason to believe, and does verily believe" that certain property was unlawfully
possessed at a specific location. The search warrant was held to be invalid since
no facts were stated upon which the issuing officer could determine if there was
probable cause.
13. Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47, 54 Sup. Ct. 11, 13 (1933).
14. United States v. McKay, 2 F.2d 257 (D.C. Nev. 1924).
15. Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124, 53 Sup. Ct. 38 (1932).
16. 362 U.S. 257, 80 Sup. Ct. 725 (1960).
17. For example, the informer had given information in the past which proved
reliable, the same information was obtained from other sources, and the affiant
had personal knowledge which corroborated the hearsay, or other circumstances
tending to credit the hearsay.
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prior to this time is immaterial. Thus, it has been held that a single
unlawful sale of liquor to the affant two months before a warrant is sought
will not justify the subsequent issuance of the search warrant.'8 The court
reasoned that there was nothing to show that the defendant was unlaw-
fully selling liquor at the time the warrant was obtained.
The burden of proof is on the defendant to show lack of probable
cause when the search warrant appears valid on its face. 19 It has been
held, however, that in the absence of fraud, the defendant cannot attack
a search warrant, valid on its face, on the ground that the magistrate did
not personally inquire into the issue of probable cause.20
B.
Description of the Premises to be Searched.
In this area we are immediately met by a deviation from the literal
terms of the fourth amendment. Realizing the intent of the constitu-
tional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures, the courts
have not required a metes and bounds description of the premises to be
searched. Rather, as stated by the Supreme Court in Steele v. United
States: "It is enough if the description is such that the officer with a
search warrant -can, with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the
place intended". 21
Thus, despite the fact that the premises is neither numbered nor
named, the search warrant will be valid if the officer can easily identify
and locate it without guessing or exercising uninformed discretion. 22 A
warrant to search a house on X road would undoubtedly be valid if there
was only one house on that particular road, but it would be invalid if
there were two or more homes on the particular road.23
C.
Description of the Property to be Seized.
As in the description of the premises, the property to be seized need
not be described in particular detail. It is often difficult, and many times
impossible, to determine whether the property to be seized is heroin or
marijuana, although it is known that narcotics are unlawfully on the
18. Rupinski v. United States, 4 F.2d 17 (6th Cir. 1925).
19. United States v. Rellie, 39 F. Supp. 21 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
20. Levin v. Blair, 17 F.2d 151 (E.D. Pa 1927).
21. 267. U.S. 498, 503, 45 Sup. Ct. 414, 416 (1925).
22. Thus, in Giacolone v. United States, 13 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1926), the
court held valid a search warrant issued to search "a barn located on the Summit
Road, 2.8 miles south of Tacoma, the second farm on the left side of the road
after turning to the right".
23. In Fall v. United States, 33 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1929), the court held invalid
a warrant authorizing the search of "a ranch with small building used for residence,
located about 5 miles in a westerly direction from the town of Silver Bow, Mon-
tana." In McGinnis v. United States, 227 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1955) a warrant to
search the barn of John Doe was held to be invalid since there were many barns in
the area.
[VOL. 7
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premises. Similarly, the police may know that contraband liquor is on
the premises, but they do not know if it is scotch, rye, or some other type.
Under these circumstances the warrant will be sufficiently specific if it
describes the property to be seized as "narcotics" or as "cases of whisky."24
The test appears to be whether the officer executing the warrant can be
reasonably certain as to the property subject to seizure, or whether he
must exercise discretion or independent judgment in making this determi-
nation. In the latter instance, the warrant should be held invalid as not
describing the property to be seized with sufficient particularity.25
D.
Seizure of Property Not Listed in the Search Warrant.
It is quite common for police to find untaxed liquor, for example,
while executing a valid warrant authorizing the search for, and seizure of,
narcotics. Not only is it unlikely that the police officer would ignore the
liquor, but it could be argued that he would be derelict in his duty were
he to do so. Nevertheless, the principle seems well established that the
search warrant will not justify a seizure of the liquor.26 This is not to
say, however, that contraband can never be seized when a search is being
conducted under a warrant authorizing the seizure of other property.
As the police officer is acting pursuant to a valid search warrant he
is not a trespasser, but is lawfully on the premises. If, in the course of
his search for the property listed, the officer discovers articles used in the
commission of crime, it is his duty to seize them. The justification for this
seizure is not the search warrant, but the general duty and obligation of a
police officer to prevent the commission of crime.27 Unfortunately, the
courts apply this rule indiscriminately, and it appears they often overlook
the reason supporting it. The following hypothetical situation illustrates
the point.
A police officer, while executing a valid search warrant authorizing
the seizure of lottery paraphernalia, discovers a rifle in defendant's home
24. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 45 Sup. Ct. 414 (1925).
25. In Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property, 367 U.S. 717, 81 Sup. Ct. 1708
(1961), the Court held invalid a seizure of obscene literature under a search war-
rant authorizing the seizure of "obscene publications" on the ground, inter alia,
that too wide a range of discretion was given the officers.
26. In Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196, 48 Sup. Ct. 74, 76 (1927),
the Court stated: "The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the
things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the
seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another". Cofer v. United States,
37 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1930); United States v. Camarota, 278 Fed. 388 (S.D.
Calif. 1922).
27. In Johnson v. United States, 293 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1961), officers
searched defendant's dwelling under a search warrant listing personal property of
complainant. In the course of their search they discovered a credit card in com-
plainant's name which was seized although not mentioned in the search warrant.
The court held the seizure was valid since officers can seize items not listed in the
search warrant if they are instrumentalities of crime, and the credit card was an item
by which crime could be committed. United States v. Camarota supra note 26.
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which he seizes. On these facts alone most courts would permit the rifle
to be received in evidence at any trial if relevant. It is clear, however,
that many have rifles in their homes for lawful purposes such as hunting.
They have a license which permits them to own the weapon, so their
possession of it is not unlawful. Surely, the average hunter will not use
his rifle to commit a crime, so how then can such a seizure be justified?
Certainly no crime is being committed in the presence of the officer when
the law permits possession of the weapon. Lack of knowledge of these
facts is not a valid reason for holding an otherwise unconstitutional
seizure lawful.
III.
SEARCH AND S9IZUR4 WITHOUT A SEARCH WARRANT.
Although not expressly excepted from the fourth amendment, it is
recognized that under certain circumstances a search and seizure will not
violate the defendant's constitutional right notwithstanding the lack of
a valid search warrant. The purpose of this section is to discuss and
illustrate these special situations.
A.
Search Incident to a Lawful Arrest.
It is well established that a search and seizure incident to a lawful
arrest is constitutionally reasonable, regardless of the fact that the arresting
officer does not possess a search warrant.28 It must be emphasized that the
right to search accompanies only a lawful arrest, either by a warrant of
arrest or under the officer's statutory or common law right to arrest
without a warrant. 29 It should be noted, however, that the right of search
28. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 Sup. Ct. 430 (1950); Agnello
v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 46 Sup. Ct. 4 (1925).
29. At common law a peace officer can arrest for a felony, without a warrant
of, arrest, when: (1) the person to be arrested has committed a felony in the
presence of the officer, (2) the person to be arrested is known to have committed
a felony, although not in the presence of the officer, (3) the officer knows that a
felony has been committed and has reasonable grounds to believe that the person
to be arrested has committed it, or (4) the officer has reasonable grounds to believe
both that a felony has been committed and that the person to be arrested has
committed it. ALI, CoDE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21 (Official Draft 1930) ; Note,
Philadelphia Police Practice and the Law of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L. Rzv. 1182
(1952). Cases discussing the requirement of probable cause, or reasonable grounds,
for belief are: Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 Sup. Ct. 168 (1959) ; Draper
v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 Sup. Ct. 329 (1959); Cochran v. United States,
291 F.2d .633 (8th Cir. 1961); Contee v. United States, 215 F.2d 324 (D.C. Cir.
1954) ; United States v. Heitner, 149 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 727, 66 Sup. Ct. 33 (1945).; People v. Henneman, 367 Ill. 151, 10 N.E.2d
649 (1937). It is generally agreed that a peace officer can arrest for a misdemeanor,
without a warrant of arrest, only if the crime is committed in his presence. ALI,
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra; Note, Philadelphia Police Practice and the
Law of Arrest, supra. A split of authority exists, however, as to whether the
misdemeanor in addition must amount to a breach of the peace. ALI, CODE Of
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra at 231 cites statutory and case authority for each
view.
[VOL. 7
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incident to a lawful arrest is not without limitation. The question of un-
reasonable search and seizure is not necessarily foreclosed simply because
the court finds there was a lawful arrest of the defendant.
An important qualification of the rule permitting a search incident to
a lawful arrest is the limitation on the area which the arresting officers may
search. Clearly, the arresting officer may lawfully search both the person
of the one arrested, and any containers or receptacles he may be carry-
ing at the time of his arrest.30 This includes a search and seizure of articles
concealed within the body of the arrestee; for example, narcotics secreted
in the petitioner's rectum.81 The problem arises where the officers attempt
to search a place or thing some distance from the precise spot of the arrest;
it may be distant rooms in the same building or a nearby automobile.
In Marron v. United States,3 2 the Court stated that when the officers
validly arrested one serving liquor in violation of law, the arresting officers
had the right to search all parts of the premises used for the unlawful
purpose. This right to search parts of the premises unrelated to the place
of the arrest was likewise recognized in Harris v. United States.33 In the
latter case officers arrested the petitioner in the living room of his four
room apartment on a charge of sending forged checks through the mails.
The officers made an exhaustive- search of petitioner's entire apartment,
and found unlawfully possessed Selective Service Cards in the bedroom.
In upholding this extensive search, the Court held that under "appropriate
circumstances" a search incident to a-lawful arrest may extend beyond the
arrestee to include the premises under his control. The Court stated that
the area subject to a search is not to be controlled by the spot where de-
fendant is arrested, and emphasized the nature and size of the objects sought
(checks), and the control of petitioner over the entire apartment.
The problem of the area subject to search is similarly posed when one
is arrested out of doors, and the arresting officers endeavor to search the
surrounding terrain, or a nearby building or automobile. In Agnello v.
United States,84 the Supreme Court, without deciding how much of the
area immediately surrounding the arrestee could be searched, held that a
search of the arrestee's home several blocks from the scene of the arrest
could not be justified as incident to the arrest. Subsequent cases in the
federal courts have further explored this field, and it has been held that a
search of the arrestee's automobile, one hundred feet from his arrest in
an open field, was valid since a dwelling was not involved and the automo-
bile was in the immediate vicinity of the place of arrest.3 5 This "immediate
30. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 Sup. Ct. 329 (1959), wherein the
Court permitted a search of an overnight bag being carried by the one arrested
at the time of his arrest.
31. Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied. 356
U.S. 914, 78 Sup. Ct. 672 (1958). Of course, the search must be accomplished in a
reasonable manner.
32. 275 U.S. 192, 48 Sup. Ct. 74 (1927).
33. 331 U.S. 145, 67 Sup. Ct. 1098 (1947).
34. 269 U.S. 20, 46 Sup. Ct. 4 (1925).
35. Rhoads v. United States, 224 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1943).
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vicinity" test has also been held to justify the search of a barn one hundred
yards from the scene of the arrest. In this case the court reasoned that
the place of arrest is to be construed to include the "immediate vicinity"
ancl not merely the precise physical spot where the arrest technically
occurred. 36 It thus appears that the courts will permit a search to be con-
ducted within a reasonable radius of the place of arrest provided the search
is in fact incidental to, or contemporaneous with, the arrest. This latter
element is worthy of note as it may easily be overlooked as a necessary
ingredient of a valid search incident to a lawful arrest. It is not necessary
that the search occur at precisely the same moment as the arrest since,
in fact, this is usually impossible; but it is necessary that the search follow
so closely upon the arrest that the former can truly be considered a con-
tinuation of the latter. In short, the search must be part and parcel of
the arrest.
Thus, in the AgnellosT case, the Court stated that a search of the
arrestee's home subsequent to his arrest several blocks away, while the
arrestee was being transported to jail, was not incident to the arrest since
the arrest had already been effectuated and the one arrested was totally
removed from the scene. It has also been held that a search of the
arrestee's apartment, to which he had been taken after the arrest had been
made in his automobile a short distance away, was invalid as not being
incident to his arrest.38 The court stated that to take one already arrested
to his apartment does not make a search of that apartment incident to the
arrest.
Often the police will make an arrest not so much for the purpose of
putting the one arrested in jail, although of course they intend to do so,
but in order to search his person and property as an incident of the arrest.
The courts, however, have held such searches to be violative of the fourth
amendment.8 9 They have reasoned that when the primary purpose for the
arrest is to make a search, the arrest becomes a mere pretext or subterfuge
and, in fact, is an incident of the search; as such, it is not permitted by the
fourth amendment. Of course, an arresting officer has every right to make
a search incident to a lawful arrest, and the search is not unreasonable
merely because he was cognizant of this fact prior to making the arrest.
Indeed, the public would suffer greatly if police officers were not aware of
this right or, more appropriately, this duty. The search becomes unrea-
sonable only when the officer makes the arrest primarily for the purpose
of gaining access to the defendant's property.
36. Kelly v. United States, 61 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 1932).
37. 269 U.S. 20, 46 Sup. Ct. 4 (1925).
38. United States v. Scott, 149 F. Supp. 847 (D.D.C. 1957). Contra, People v.
Cicchello, 157 Cal. App. 2d 158, 320, P.2d 528 (1958).
39. McKnight v. United States, 188 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1950); United States
v. Kowal, 197 F. Supp. 401 (D.C. R.I. 1961); see United States v. Alberti, 120 F.
Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
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B.
Search of Automobiles.
The growth and development of the automobile presented law enforce-
knent officers with a problem hitherto unknown. The speed with which
criminals could now flee from the jurisdiction made it impracticable to
require officers to secure a search warrant before commencing a search of
an automobile suspected of carrying contraband. By the time a warrant
was procured, the vehicle was either outside the limits of the jurisdiction
and thus immune from its process, or the occupants had already relieved
the vehicle of its illicit cargo. The Supreme Court recognized this dilemma
and finally, in Carroll v. United States, stated:
.. . the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable search and seizure
by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the
beginning of the government, as recognizing a necessary difference
between a search of a store, dwelling house, or other structure in
respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained and
a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon or automobile for contraband
goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought.40
The Court then went on to state the circumstances under which a vehicle
could be searched without a search warrant.
On reason and authority the true rule is that if the search and seizure
without a warrant are made upon probable cause, that is, upon a
belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing
officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by
law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are
valid.41
Thus, it is clear that a search of an automobile can be made under circum-
stances in which a similar search of an individual or building would
be unlawful. There need be no arrest of the occupant of the vehicle
or a valid search warrant in order to justify the search of an automobile;
the fact that the officer has probable cause to believe the vehicle contains
contraband is sufficient.
In Brinegar v. United States,42 the Court held that an officer, who
noticed the petitioner driving into Oklahoma from Missouri, recognized him
as one whom he had arrested several months before for illegal transportation
of liquor, and' had seen him buy liquor in Missouri within the last six
40. 267 U.S. 132, 135, 45 Sup. Ct. 280, 285 (1925).
41. Id. at 149, 45 Sup. Ct. at 283-84. In United States v. One 1941 Oldsmobile
Sedan, 158 F.2d 818, 819 (10th Cir. 1947), the court stated: "Generally, it may be
said that probable cause exists where the facts or reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom are such as should lead a reasonably prudent and intelligent person to
conclude that there is a good ground to believe that the law is being violated".
42. 338 U.S. 160, 60 Sup. Ct. 1302 (1949).
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months in the same car, had sufficient probable cause to stop and search the
vehicle in order to ascertain if it was being used to transport liquor. The
Court rested its conclusion on the Carroll decision wherein the Court found
probable cause in that the officers knew or had good reason to know
the occupants of the car were engaged in illegally transporting liquor, the
automobile was recognized as being used in their business, and they were
coming from a known source of supply to a known center of illegal distri-
bution.
In Patenotte v. United States,43 the court listed five fact situations to
be considered in determining if there is probable cause to stop and search a
vehicle: (1) the reputation of, or the informant's reports concerning, the
occupants; (2) the reputation of the vehicle or its owners; (3) the con-
dition of the vehicle (e.g. weighted down) ; (4) information from informers
as to the illegal nature of the trip; and (5) the reputation of the place
where the vehicle is found. In the Brinegar and Carroll cases situations
(1) and (2) were predominant, while (5) was also present. Other cases
have found probable cause on the information of a reliable informant that a
person the officer knew to have been convicted for the illegal transportation
of liquor, again had liquor concealed in his automobile ;44 or on the informa-
tion of a reliable informant that the defendant was to pick up narcotics,
when this was verified by the police observing the suspect driving from one
town to another.4 5 It has been held, however, that where police officers
receive information from a reliable informant that one is about to make a
delivery of illicit liquor to another known to be dealing in such contraband,
there is not probable cause to stop and search the automobile of the alleged
transportor. 46 Here, it will be noticed, the only justification for the search
was the word of the informant, and although he had proven reliable in the
past, this was not sufficient in the absence of evidence of the driver's
reputation, the condition of the car, or the reputation of the locale.
With reference to the five factors put forth in the Patenotte case, it
is interesting to note that the court in this last case did not feel that the
presence of elements (1) and (4) were sufficient to establish probable
cause. In this area of the law of search and seizure, as in the other phases
where the issue of probable cause is determinative, the courts differ not
in principle but in the weight they will accord to the same piece of evi-
dence. Thus, one court had found probable cause to exist when police
saw a known narcotics user driving a car in a suspicious manner, and
when, upon attempting to stop him, the car sped away.47 Of course, the
element of flight, present here, was absent in the prior case.
Probable cause to search an automobile must arise within a reasonable
time prior to the actual search. Thtis, a search of one's automobile in
43. 266 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1959).
44. Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 51 Sup. Ct. 240 (1931).
45. United States v. Hill, 114 F. Supp. 441 (D.D.C. 1953).
46. Price v. United States, 262 F.2d 684 (10th Cir. 1959).
47. United States v. One 1951 Cadillac Coupe, 139 F. Supp. 475 (E.D. Pa.
1956).
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December could not be justified by a showing that there was probable
cause for the search in September. 4 This result seems inescapable since
the fact that there was probable cause to believe an automobile was carrying
contraband at one time in no way supports the conclusion that it was
carrying contraband three months later.
In United States v. Di Re,4 9 the Court held that the right to search
an automobile without a search warrant does not necessarily include the
right to search all of the occupants. Therefore, the search of an unknown
occupant of an automobile in which the suspected criminal had sold
counterfeit gasoline rations to an informer was held unlawful.
Immobile Vehicles.
As pointed out earlier, the rationale supporting the special rule for
automobiles is the necessity for quick action in order to prevent the swift
moving vehicle from escaping. Thus, when the suspected vehicle is
immobile and there is no possibility of its being moved to a position out-
side the reach of the law, there is no reason for permitting a search
in the absence of a proper warrant, or a lawful arrest of the driver.
This was recognized in Rent v. United States, °0 where the police officers
attempted to justify the search of an automobile on the ground that, inter
alia, there was no need for a search warrant under the Carroll doctrine.
In this case, however, the automobile had been parked and locked on the
police parking lot for over ten hours after the arrest of its occupant. It
is to be hoped that more courts will look behind the Carroll rule to test
its applicability, rather than blindly following a principle created to meet
one particular condition.
Roadblocks.
A police device which can create problems in this area is the
roadblock; it is used by police departments either to prevent the escape
of a criminal, or merely to check the contents of an automobile as a
precautionary measure against nothing in particular and everything in
general. While it can be conceded that such measures may at times be
necessary for the public welfare, this does not conclusively establish the
legality of such action. Indeed it would seem that a citizen lawfully using
the public highway is constitutionally protected against promiscuous in-
trusions into his free movement. On the other hand, sound police practice
may dictate such action as the only means of capturing a criminal or
preventing the commission of a crime. The problem then is to balance
these two conflicting interests within the framework of the Constitution.
In United States v. Bonanno,51 where police stopped many cars leaving a
48. Cervantes v. United States, 263 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1959).
49. 332 U.S. 581, 68 Sup. Ct. 222 (1948).
50. 209 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1954).
51. 180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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meeting of criminals and asked the occupants their names, occupation, and
other pertinent questions, the court laid down three requirements for such
a mass stoppage of vehicles: (1) belief by the officers that a crime might
have been committed, (2) reasonable grounds for such a belief, and (3)
absolute necessity for immediate investigation. Guided by these principles,
the court held that the police acted lawfully in this instance. On the other
hand, Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in Brinegar v. United States, pro-
posed a different test for balancing the conflicting interests of the individual
and the public:
If we assume, for example, that a child is kidnapped and the officers
throw a roadblock about the neighborhood and search every out-
going car, it would be a drastic and undiscriminating use of the search.
The officers might be unable to show probable cause for searching
any particular car. However, I should strive hard to sustain such an
action, executed fairly and in good faith, because it might be reason-
able to subject travelers to that indignity if it was the only way to
save a threatened life and detect a vicious crime. But I should not
strain to sustain such a roadblock and universal search to salvage a
few bottles of bourbon and catch a bootlegger.52
These two divergent views reflect the necessity for an authoritative answer
to this perplexing problem. Neither the position of Judge Kaufman, that
the balance is to be struck in favor of the public welfare if the police act
in the reasonable belief that any crime might have been committed, nor
the argument of Mr. Justice Jackson that the criterion is the gravity of
the alleged criminal act has been adopted by the Supreme Court. It is
vital that the Court, in interpreting the bounds of the fourth amendment,
address itself to this most important issue at its earliest opportunity.
Traffic Violations.
An often recurring aspect of the problems involved in a search of an
automobile is the right of an officer to search the vehicle incident to its
detention for an ordinary traffic violation. Although no federal cases have
been found in this particular area, the practice is sufficiently common to
merit an examination of the prevailing principles. It should be kept in
mind that it is assumed the officers did not have probable cause to believe the
automobile contained contraband at the time of the search and, therefore,
their conduct cannot be justified on the basis of the previously discussed
concepts. The holdings of the cases in this area can then be divided into
three distinct camps: (1) those which permit a complete search of the
automobile, (2) those which permit a limited search under certain circum-
stances, and (3) those which do not permit any search.
The first group of cases is illustrated by Haverstick v. State,53 where
the court upheld a conviction for the unlawful transportation of liquor.
52. 338 U.S. 160, 183, 60 Sup. Ct. 1302, 1314 (1949).
53. 196 Ind. 145, 147 N.E. 625 (1925).
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The petitioner was stopped for speeding, and a search of his automobile
revealed liquor which was seized by the officers. Other jurisdictions have
likewise permitted the search of an automobile stopped for violating a
provision of the motor vehicle code. 54
The second category of decisions includes Brinegar v. State,55 where-
in the court stated that a traffic violation does not ipso facto permit the
police to search the entire automobile. The court held, however, that the
officers could search for weapons in order to. protect themselves if they
had good reason to believe the driver was armed or dangerous. Thus,
the court held that a search of the glove' compartment for weapons was
lawful, and upon discovering liquor therein the officers had the right to
search the entire car for more of this contraband. In People v. Watkins,
the court stated:
Search incident to arrest is authorized when it is reasonably necessary
to protect the arresting officer from attack, to prevent the prisoner
from escaping, or to discover fruits of a crime. But the violation
involved in this case was parking too close to a crosswalk .... Such
an offense does not, in itself, raise the kind of inferences which justify
searches in other cases. Some traffic violations would justify a search.
The total absence of license plates ... (or) an obscured license plate
upon a car driven in the early morning hours [for example] ...16
Finally, there is authority for the position that a traffic violation never
presents grounds for a search of the automobile. Thus, it has been held
unlawful to search the trunk of an automobile stopped to permit an arrest
of the driver for operating the vehicle while intoxicated.5 7
Those jurisdictions which permit a search of the automobile base
their decisions on the theory that such a search is conducted incident to a
lawful arrest. Of course, this presupposes that"a traffic violation is at least
a misdemeanor for which an arrest on view can Se made if it is committed in
the presence of the officer. If, however, infractions of the state vehicle code
are mere "violations" rather than offenses which permit an "arrest" in
the technical sense,58 it would seem that the theoretical foundation of such
a rationale is non-existent. In these jurisdictions it would appear incon-
sistent with many decisions of the Supreme Court to permit a search of
an automobile incident to a traffic violation.
Even in jurisdictions which permit an arrest for a traffic violation
it would seem that a general search of the automobile would be entirely
unrelated to the offense precipitating the arrest. Certainly, if one is
arrested for going through a stop sign, a search of the vehicle will not
54. Neely v. State, 164 N.E.2d 110 (nd. 1960) (going through a stop sign);
Stout v. State, 90 Okla. Cr. 360, 214 P.2d 271 (1950); Duncan v. State, 191 Tenn.
427, 234 S.W.2d 835 (1950).
55. 97 Okla. Cr. 299, 262 P.2d 464 (1953) But see Stout v. State, supra note 54.
56. 19 Ill. 2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433, 437 (1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 833, 81
Sup. Ct. 57 (1960).
57. Courington v. State, 74 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1954).
58. See e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, Sec. 1204 (1960).
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reveal objects connected in any way with this unlawful conduct. To
permit a plenary search under such circumstances appears to emasculate
the protection given the individual under the fourth amendment. The
intent of the arresting officer in these cases is to discover objects which
at best might reveal the commission of an unallied crime, or objects of
mere evidentiary value. If the former intent predominates it is difficult to
see how the search can properly be termed incident to the offense for which
the arrest is made, while if the latter intent prevails the search is clearly
unlawful since its purpose is to obtain objects of evidential value.59
In many cases the arrest is but a subterfuge to permit the police
to gain access to a vehicle for the purposes of a search. Thus, the
police may suspect that one is transporting contraband, but their suspicions
do not rise to the level of probable cause. In such cases they may
well follow the automobile in order to detect the slightest violation of
the motor vehicle code for which an arrest can be made. There is
authority for the position that such police conduct is improper, and the
search is invalid since the arrest cannot be a mere subterfuge made in
order to search the vehicle.60
C.
Defendants' Rights of Privacy or Property Not Violated.
The privilege to complain of an illegal search and seizure is personal
to the one whose rights are violated. If the police unlawfully seize objects
from another, the defendant cannot object to their admission into evidence
against him since no rights of the defendant have been violated. Thus, it
has been held that the sole shareholder of a corporation, charged with
violating the Emergency Price Control Act, cannot object when the
business records of the corporation are unlawfully seized since the cor-
poration is a distinct entity and only its rights are violated.6' Although
the federal courts are bound by Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure which requires the defendant to be a "party aggrieved,"
this has been interpreted as applying the general rule that one will not
be heard to claim a constitutional right unless he belongs to the class
protected. 62 It would thus appear that the principles articulated by the
federal courts in determining the meaning of Rule 41(e) are applicable
when discussing whether the defendant's rights have been abridged.
Although generally one cannot successfully maintain a motion to
suppress when the police unlawfully enter another's property and seize
objects belonging to the property owner, the defendant can object if he
was lawfully present on the property at the time of the illegal entry. By
59. See Part VI infra.
60. Branson v. State, 270 P.2d 362 (Okla. Cr. 1954).
61. Lagow v. United States, 159 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331
U.S. 858, 67 Sup. Ct. 1750 (1947).
62. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 Sup. Ct. 725 (1960).
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reversing a series of earlier decisions, the Supreme Court recently held
that anyone legitimately on the premises when a search is conducted.
whether a guest, invitee, boarder or otherwise, has a sufficient interest in
the premises to be a "party aggrieved" and therefore can argue that his
constitutional right was violated.6 3 It is to be emphasized, however, that
the Constitution not only protects against invasions of privacy, but also
against threats to the security of property. In order to meet this latter
requirement, the defendant must at least allege that he owned the seized
property, or that he had a proprietory or possessory interest in it, or that it
"belonged" to him.6 4 There is, however, one exception to this rule.
In Jones v. United States,65 the Supreme Court also held that where
the defendant can be convicted for possession, of the seized objects under
the indictment or appropriate statute, the charge against him gives him the
requisite standing, and in his motion to suppress he need not allege a
possessory interest. This decision resolved a dilemma which had placed a
serious obstacle in the path of those charged with the possession of contra-
band who wished to object to the manner in which the incriminating
evidence was obtained. In order to come within the class protected by the
fourth amendment, the defendant was forced to allege a proprietory interest
in the contraband, but by so doing he admitted the essential element of the
crime with which he was charged. The Court quite properly recognized
and resolved this enigma.
In accordance with the principle that one cannot object to a seizure
of property in which he does not have a proprietory interest, one has
no standing to complain about the seizure of abandoned property. Thus,
the police can lawfully seize a jug of whisky discarded by a fleeing suspect,6 6
or property deposited in the waste basket by one arrested prior to his being
taken to jail.6 7 However, following the poisonous tree doctrine, (discussed
infra) it has been held that if there was an unlawful arrest, abandoned
property, which was discarded as a consequence of the unlawful arrest, is
protected.68 Although such a holding is consistent with the poisonous tree
doctrine, it appears to overlook the "party aggrieved" requirement.
Naturally, there is no violation of fourth amendment rights if, in
fact, there has been no search. Authorities are useful to illustrate the dis-
tinction between mere observation and a constitutionally regulated search.
To observe that which occurs openly in a public place,6 9 or is clearly
detectable by daylight or artificial light, is not a search. 70 Thus, where
63. Ibid.
64. Ramirez v. United States. 294 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1961).
65. 362 U.S. 257, 80 Sup. Ct. 725 (1960).
66. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 44 Sup. Ct. 445 (1924).
67. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 80 Sup. Ct. 683 (1960).
68. Williams v. United States, 263 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959) cert. denied, 365
U.S. 836, 81 Sup. Ct. 751 (1961).
69. Trujillo v. United States, 294 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1961).
70. United States v. Jankowski, 28 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1928) ; People v. Chorlis,
223 Mich. 289, 193 N.W. 796 (192.3).
COM .I ENT"S
15
Editors: Comments
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1962
VTLLANOVA LAW REVIEW
police officers went to the home of a suspected burglar, an arrest without
a warrant was justified on the basis of the officers' observation of several
of the objects reported to have been stolen lying openly on the ground
near the porch where the officers stood waiting admittance. 71
There is not a search when the objects are plainly in view; nor
is there a search when the police intrude into one's privacy by means of
their senses, and detect objects or conversations by the mere use of their
faculties of sight or hearing. To look through the windows of an auto-
mobile is not a search, and there is probable cause to arrest the occupant
if burglars' tools are seen on the back seat.72 Statements made by the
defendant which were amplified by a hidden microphone concealed on an
informer, and picked up by an agent with a receiving set were admitted
over the defendant's objection.78 The Supreme Court reasoned that this
was the same as if the agent had been eavesdropping outside defendant's
window, or had used binoculars to magnify his vision in order to see what
was supposed to be private. In such cases, the Court felt that the fourth
amendment would not be violated. However, less than ten years later,
the Court held in Silverman v. United States74 that there was an unrea-
sonable search and seizure when police officers inserted the spike of a
microphone into the heating duct of the defendant's home through the
baseboard of the adjoining dwelling. The Court distinguished the prior
case by saying that in Silverman there was a trespass on the defendant's
property by the intrusion of the spike, while in the previous case there
was no trespass. Although this distinction may at first appear tenuous, if
one recalls the rationale of the Court in the earlier case any incon-
sistencies are dissolved. In the first case the Court found no search
because it was as if the agent had stood by a window while the defendant
spoke freely to the informer; the mechanical device was mere surplusage.
In Silverman, however, the mechanical device was the only hope the agents
had of learning the content of the defendant's conversations; it was as if
the agent secreted himself in the defendant's home in order to overhear
his conversations. Finally, it has been held that if the defendant admits every
material fact testified to by the officers he is in no position to argue that the
officer's testimony was admitted in violation of the fourth amendment. 75
D.
Consent.
Like all constitutional rights, the privilege to be secure from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures can be waived. It is clear, however, that the
courts will indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of one's
constitutional rights. Such a waiver will ordinarily be found only when
71. Ellison v. United States, 206 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
72. People v. Stewart, 177 N.E.2d 237 (Ill. 1961).
73. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 72 Sup. Ct. 967 (1952).
74. 365 U.S. 505, 81 Sup. Ct. 679 (1961).
75. Libera v. United States, 299 Fed. 300 (9th Cir. 1924).
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there is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right
or privilege.70 It has been held (in accord with the general rule that
matters relating to the legality of a search and seizure are questions for
the judge) that whether the defendant did in fact voluntarily consent to
the search is a question for the court and not the jury.77 The two major
problems which arise in this area are whether the consent was voluntarily
given, and whether the consent by one other than the defendant is binding
upon the latter.
Perhaps the best definition of the nature of the consent needed to find
a waiver of one's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures was expressed in Ray v. United States when the court stated:
The consent which opens the doors of a private home to official search
and seizure cannot be deemed voluntary unless it be made clearly to
appear that it was freely and intelligently given, not expressly or im-
pliedly coerced.78
An examination of the decisions of various courts in order to discern the
precise circumstances under which the consent has been held voluntary is
helpful. The reader should be cautioned, however, against placing too
much reliance on precedent since it is not often that two cases will be
factually identical, and the most minute distinction can be of the greatest
significance. The following cases are considered merely to illustrate what
has been done in the past rather than to predict with accuracy what will
be done in the future.7 9
In Amos v. United States,80 several federal agents went to peti-
tioner's home, and upon learning of the petitioner's absence identified
themselves to his wife and explained that they wished to search for
violations of the revenue laws. Petitioner's wife permitted the agents to
search the dwelling, and petitioner's motion to suppress the objects seized
was granted by the Court. In dismissing the government's contention that
petitioner's wife consented to the search, the Court stated that there was
an element of implied coercion present and, therefore, the consent was not
voluntary. Following the logic of this decision, it could be argued that
whenever an officer requests permission to search there is no voluntary
consent, but rather a succumbing to authority. Some courts have indeed
followed such a line of reasoning,s ' and this position is exemplified by
Higgins v. United States where the court stated:
It follows that when police identify themselves as such, search a room
and find contraband in it. the occupant's words or signs of acquiescence
in the search, accompanied by a denial of guilt, do not show consent:
76. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 Sup. Ct. 1019 (1938).
77. United States v. Bianco, 96 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1938).
78. 84 F2d 654, 656 (5th Cir. 1936).
79. For an excellent review of the cases decided in this area see Judd v. United
States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
80. 255 U.S. 313, 41 Sup. Ct. 266 (1921).
81. United States v. Slusser, 270 Fed. 818 (S.D. Ohio 1921) ; Cofer v. United
States, 37 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1930) ; Meno v. State, 197 Ind. 16, 164 N.E. 93 (1925).
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at least in the absence of some extraordinary circumstances such as
ignorance that contraband is present.82
It is submitted that if these cases are categorically correct it is impos-
sible to establish voluntary consent. Almost without exception the cases
present the situation of a police officer requesting permission to search, and
if this fact alone precludes a finding of free consent this defense to the
motion to suppress is effectively abolished. Quite properly, however, many
courts have not been inclined to follow such a rigid and conclusive approach
to the issue.
Thus, it has been held that the consent was freely given when the
defendant, suspected of selling narcotics, told the officers to "Go right in.
You can look around" ;83 or when the officers went to petitioner's room for
questioning, and upon requesting permission to look around the petitioner
stated, "No, certainly, go ahead gentlemen".8 4 Other cases, although not
finding the consent to have been given voluntarily, have rested their
decision on grounds other than the mere fact that the petitioner was con-
fronted by a police officer. It has been held that the consent was not freely
given when the defendant permitted a search while under arrest and in
the custody of five officers, 85 or when the police officers entered petitioner's
home at midnight and conducted themselves in a demanding fashion prior
to petitioner's granting them permission to make a search.86
At least one case has held that consent to a search may be consent to
a search of only a particular part of a building. Thus, where petitioner lived
in the rear of his saloon, his consent to a search for liquor and beer did
not cover a search of his living quarters.8 T The court reasoned that the
permission was given while the petitioner was standing in the saloon, and
the objects sought were sold, if at all, in this part of the building so that
petitioner quite reasonably assumed that the search would be conducted
only in the front of the building. The duty of the court in resolving the
issue of consent is to examine, in retrospect, the defendants' state of mind.
It is, therefore, proper to determine the extent of his consent, and if the
evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant believed the search was
to be conducted in but one room, the court should not construe the per-
mission as extending to other rooms.
Once it is established that the consent was freely given the court
must determine if it is binding upon the defendant. Of course, if the de-
fendant gave the consent he is bound by it and, in the absence of extra-
ordinary circumstances, the court will find that his constitutional right has
not been denied. It is not unusual, however, for one other than the de-
82. 209 F.2d 819, 820 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
83. United States v. Dornblut, 261 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 360
U.S. 912, 79 Sup. Ct. 1298 (1959).
84. Honig v. United States, 208 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1953).
85. United States v. Alberti, 120 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
86. Catalanotte v. United' States, 208 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1953).
87. Karwicki v. United States, 55 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1932).
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fendant to give the officers permission to search and seize the defendant's
property, and the question then remains whether this consent binds the
defendant.
Most frequently the consent is given by defendant's spouse, and there
is a split in the authorities as to the effect of such consent. Some cases
appear to hold without reservation that a consent to a search of the dwell-
ing by one spouse is binding upon the other,88 while other courts have
just as strenuously advocated the opposite conclusion.8 9 It would appear
that the mere marital relationship should not be sufficient to give one party
the right to waive a personal right of another, and that more should
be required before holding that the consent of one spouse is enough to
effectively destroy the other spouse's right. This middle position has been
accepted by several courts which have held that where one spouse is in
charge of the premises when the request to search is made, 90 or the prop-
erty is recorded in the joint names of the spouses,9 ' consent by one is
binding upon the other. While it could be argued that these added factors
are not very significant, it would seem that there should be more than a
bare legal relationship in order to find that one has been deprived of a basic
constitutional right by the conduct of another. Moreover, this asserted
middle position is consistant with the general rule that where two persons
have equal rights to the use, possession or occupancy of property, either
may consent to a search and the evidence seized is admissible against both
parties.92 However, it has been held by the Supreme Court that the
consent of a landlord is not binding upon his tenant,93 whereas at least
one state court has held that the consent of the tenant is binding upon
the landlord.94
E.
Search and Seizure not Conducted by the Government.
Since the Constitution restrains only governmental action, the de-
fendant cannot successfully seek to suppress evidence seized by private
individuals which, if it had been so obtained by agents of the state, would
88. United States v. Heine, 148 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S.
885, 65 Sup. Ct. 1578 (1945); see People v. Ingle, 53 Cal. 2d 407, 2 Cal. Rptr. 14
(1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 841, 81 Sup. Ct. 79 (1960).
89. United States v. Rykowski, 267 Fed. 866 (E.D. Ohio 1920); State v.
Wilkerson, 349 Mo. 205, 159 S.W.2d 794 (1942).
90. United States v. Sergio, 21 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1937).
91. Stein v. United States, 166 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S.
844, 68 Sup. Ct. 1512 (1948); People v. Shambley, 4 Il. 2d 38, 122 N.E.2d 172
(1954).
92. United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 935, 74 Sup. Ct. 630 (1954) ; see People v. Gorg, 45 Cal. 2d 776, 291 P.2d 469(1955); cf. Application of Fried, 68 F. Supp. 961 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), aff'd. in part
161 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. granted, 331 U.S. 804, 67 Sup. Ct. 1755 (1947),
cert. dismissed, 332 U.S. 807, 68 Sup. Ct. 105 (1947).
93. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 81 Sup. Ct. 776 (1961) ; accord,
Klee v. United States, 53 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1931).
94. Vejih v. State, 185 Wis. 21, 200 N.W. 659 (1924).
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be violative of the defendant's constitutional right.9 5 It is important, how-
ever, to ascertain whether the private individual was acting on his own
behalf, or was in reality an arm of the state. Thus, it has been held that
evidence seized by a private citizen, in a manner which would have
violated the fourth amendment if done by agents of the government, should
have been suppressed since the police officers watched the entire procedure
and accepted the property upon its seizure."" The court reasoned that
under these circumstances the citizen acted merely as an arm of the
police; it was as if the police had made the seizure in this manner.
IV.
SEARCH Or DWELLINGS.
As might be expected the home is given the greatest protection from
unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme Court, in construing the
intendment of the fourth amendment, has held that a dwelling can be
searched only pursuant to a proper search warrant or incident to a lawful
arrest. The Court expressed itself in the following language:
Save in certain cases as incident to arrest, there is no sanction in
the decisions of the courts, federal or state, for the search of a private
dwelling house without a warrant . . . Belief, however well founded,
that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house, furnishes no
justification for a search of the place without a warrant. And such
searches are held unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably
showng probable cause.9 7
The above cited principle is as vital today, with but a few exceptions,
as it was when first enunciated.98
It would seem, however, that under certain circumstances a search of
a dwelling should be permitted without a search warrant or arrest of the
occupant. This right was recognized, in principle, by the Supreme Court
when it stated:
There are exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the need
for effective law enforcement against the right of privacy, it may be
contended that a magistrate's warrant for search may be dispensed
with.9
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has never precisely defined "exceptional
circumstances," although it has indicated that such circumstances might
exist where there is violence, imminent threat of destruction, removal or
concealment of property intended to be seized. 100 One court has indicated
95. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 41 Sup. Ct. 574 (1921); State v.
Woods, 62 Utah 397, 220 Pac. 215 (1923).
96. Moody v. United States, 163 A.2d 337 (D.C. App. 1960).
97. Angello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33, 46 Sup. Ct. 4, 6 (1925).
98. See Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 78 Sup. Ct. 1253 (1958).
99. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15, 68 Sup. Ct. 367, 369 (1948).
100. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 Sup. Ct. 93 (1951).
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that an officer might enter a dwelling if he has probable cause to believe
it contains a dangerous instrumentality which endangers the surrounding
area. 1' 1 On reason and principle, it would seem that whenever there is
a need for immediate action, and there is not sufficient time to procure a
search warrant, it is not unreasonable to permit an officer to enter and
search a dwelling if he has probable cause to believe it contains contra-
band. Where a search is conducted under such circumstances, the court
should scrutinize the facts known to the officer in order to ascertain if the
situation demanded such extraordinary action. While the fourth amend-
ment protects the guilty and innocent with equal vigor, it must be re-
membered that the amendment is not phrased in absolute terms, and what
is unreasonable in the ordinary situation may be reasonable in an
emergency.
It is to be noted that an officer can look through an opening into
one's home without violating the constitutional proscription against un-
reasonable searches and seizures. Thus, if an officer observes a crime being
committed through an open door to a dwelling' 02 or by looking through
a window, 0 3 the officer can enter to make an arrest and incidental search.
In connection with the limits imposed on searches of dwellings, it has
been held that the room of a criminal who has fled the jurisdiction can
be searched without a warrant in order to find something which would
aid in identifying him. 1' 4
Before it can be determined if the aforementioned principles are
applicable, it must first be ascertained if the place searched is entitled to
this utmost protection. Of course, a person's home, used as such the year
around, is a dwelling; but what about a summer cottage used three months
of each year or the hotel room of a transient guest? It is necessary that a
dwelling be of a conventional nature, or is it sufficient that it is "home"
to a particular individual? Generally the courts have been generous in
holding various premises as dwellings for the purpose of giving protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Thus, it has been held that if a person is staying in a hotel room, no
matter how transiently, it is his dwelling; 105 as is an unfinished and un-
lived-in house, 06 or a house that is being lived in by the builder while his
family lives in their old home.107 It is apparent from these cases that one
can have two residences both of which are considered dwellings even
though one is unoccupied at the time of the search. One court has even
held that an excavation in a hill which was entered by a door in front,
101. United States v. Sergio, 21 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1937) (operating a still
in a dwelling in a residential area).
102. Jennings v. United States, 247 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
103. Griffin v. State, 200 Md. 569, 92 A.2d 743 (1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
907, 73 Sup. Ct. 647 (1953).
104. Sexson v. Commonwealth, 239 Ky. 177, 39 S.W.2d 229 (1931).
105. Eng Fung Jem v. United States, 281 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1960).
106. Morrison v. United States, 262 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
107. Roberson v. United States, 165 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1948).
COMMENTS
21
Editors: Comments
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1962
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
and which had an aperture in the improvised roof for escaping smoke, was
a dwelling and as such was entitled to full protection against unreasonable
search and seizure.108 Furthermore, although the protection of the fourth
amendment does not extend to the open fields,109 buildings within the
curtilage are considered dwellings.110
V.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE R EASONABLY CONDUCTED.
A search and seizure which is lawful under the principles previously
discussed may nevertheless be unreasonable, and therefore prohibited by
the fourth amendment. It is perhaps only in this area that courts have
refused to equate reasonable with lawful.
It has been uniformly held that a search and seizure must be
conducted in a reasonable manner in order to avoid the proscription of
the fourth amendment. Thus, it is unreasonable for police officers chasing
a moving vehicle to fire shots at it in order to persuade the driver to stop,
even if there is probable cause to believe it is carrying. contraband.,
The court reasoned that it was not shown that such action was necessary,
and that there existed the very real possibility of injury to an innocent
traveler on the highway. A search and seizure was also held to have been
unreasonably conducted when, incident to a lawful arrest, the police
pumped the defendant's stomach to find drugs which they suspected he
had swallowed.11 2 Blackford v. United States,113 however, sustained a
search of one's rectum by a medical doctor, against the petitioner's will,
through the use of forceps in order to secure heroin secreted therein. The
court found that the search was incident to a lawful arrest, and was reason-
able in that it was performed by a medical doctor, and was not a harmful
or painful process. In determining reasonableness the court felt that one
must look at the necessity for action and the possible alternatives. Quick
action was needed to prevent the petitioner from destroying the contra-
band, and no other method was possible since petitioner refused to
voluntarily expel the substance. The Supreme Court has recognized that
an otherwise lawful search or seizure may become unlawful due to the
manner in which it is consummated; the Court has held that it is a viola-
tion of the fourth amendment to seize, incident to a lawful arrest, the
entire contents of a cabin, including many trivial and insignificant items,
and transport them 200 miles to an F.B.I. Office for examination. 1 4
108. Morse v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 672, 265 S.W. 37 (1924).
109. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S.'57, 44 Sup. Ct. 445 (1924).
110. Hodges v. United States, 243 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1957); Roberson v.
United States, 165 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1948).
111. United States v. Costner, 153 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1946).
112. United States v. Willis, 85 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Cal. 1949).
113. 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914, 78 Sup. Ct. 672
(19S8).
114. Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346, 77 Sup. Ct. 828 (1957).
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Although this case deals with an unreasonable seizure, it would appear
that an extensive and unnecessary search of a building would be equally
unreasonable and violative of the Constitution.
It has often been argued, both in and out of the courtroom, that a
search should not be valid merely because it is incident to a lawful arrest
if the officers could have obtained a search warrant. It is claimed that to
permit a search incident to a lawful arrest when the officers had time to
secure a proper warrant is to make an exception where there is no need
to do so. In Trupiano v. United States,115 the Supreme Court accepted
this position and held, in effect, that a search without a proper warrant
is unreasonable if it is practicable to obtain a warrant prior to the com-
mencement of the search. This per se approach proved too unwieldy in
practice, however, and the Court reversed its position and rejected the
doctrine in United States v. Rabinowitz."16 In this latter case police
officers, armed with a valid warrant of arrest, searched defendant's office
as an incident to execution of the warrant. Relying on Trupiano the
defendant asserted that the search and seizure were unreasonable, but
the Court held otherwise and overruled Trupiano to the extent that it had
established that the reasonableness of a search was to be determined upon
the basis of the practicability of obtaining a search warrant. The Court
in Rabinowitz declared that the true test is whether the search itself is
reasonable which in turn depends upon the facts and circumstances of
each case. Thus the Court struck down the rigid and mechanical approach,
at least for the time being, and set a more flexible standard which
permits an analysis of each and every circumstance present when the
search was made. While this approach seems to be more desirable the
Court itself apparently does not think that the doctrine of Trupiano
is dead.117
VI.
PROPER OBJECTS OF A SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
It is important to understand that the principles to be articulated in
this section apply to searches and seizures with or without a search
warrant. Through interpretation of the fourth amendment, the courts
have consistently held that articles of mere evidential value cannot be seized.
. . . they [search warrants] may not be used as a means of gaining
access to a man's house or office and papers solely for the purpose
of making search to secure evidence to be used against him in a
criminal or penal proceeding, but that they may be resorted to only
when a primary right to such search and seizure may be found in
the interest which the public or the complainant may have in the
115. 334 U.S. 699, 68 Sup. Ct. 1229 (1948).
116. 339 U.S. 56, 70 Sup. Ct. 430 (1950).
117. See Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 81 Sup. Ct. 776 (1961).
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property'to be seized, oiin;theright -to the possession of it, or when a
valid exercise'bf the police, power renders possession of, the property
by the accused'unlawfuland provides tha it. may be taken." 8
It would seem obvious that if the objedtsisubjectr;to seizure are limited
when the officers, possess, a ,valid search- warrant, ,as the abbVe quotation
indicates, the same rule would,.apply Vith-at least equal, if not greater,
force when the search and- seizure is coriducted -without a search warrant.
Thus, in Harris v. Unitod Stdtes, iii which officers executifig a valid
-,arrant of arrist searched the apat m'ernt of .the, arreste , the Court. said:
This Court has frequently recogpized the distinction. between merely
evidentiay materials;on the one, hand, which miay not be seized'either
under the search Warrant or during the. course of a search incident to
arrest,' and on the other hand,' those objects which 'may validly be
seized including the instrumentalities and means by which a crime is
committed,,.the fruits of the crime such as stolen property, weapons
by which the escape.,6f the, person arrested might be effected, and
property the possesion 'of!which, is'a crime." 9
It is indeed "difficult at times,,to diffrriiit between. "merel evidentiary
materials" afid'articles'subject to seizirl but it- can generally be stated
that the latter group is, composed .of ar'tiles-used to commit crime; articles
subject t'forfeiture,'and articles Iwhich 'are the, fruito crime. The follow-
ing cases' wll illustrate, better than' broad generalizations, the types of
property which may lawfully be seized.
In Marron v. United States, 20 the petitioner was charged with con-
spiracy to violate the Prohibition Act, and a warrant was issued to search
the premises, leased by petitioner, for.liquor. Upon arrival on the
premises, the officers arrested the individual in charge who at the time
was serving liquor to customers, handed him the search warrant, and
commenced to search the premises. .The officers seized liquor, and various
books showing bribes,,utility. bills and other items relating to the conduct
of the unlawful. business. The Court stated that although the books and
ledgers could' not be lawfully seized under the search warrant their seizure
was justifiedfas.an- incident to the arrest. Furthermore, the objects were
properly. seized since 'they were necessary to carry on the business; they
were objects used in. the commission of a crime. In a subsequent case of
a similar nature,'2 ' the petitioners were arrested under a warrant charging
thitthey conspiredi to solicit orders for liquor. Incidental to the arrest,
the bffice of the petitioners, where the arrest took place, was searched and
variofts notebooks,. bills and letters relating to the business were seized.
.18r Gouled y. United States, 225 U.S. 298, 309, 41 Sup. Ct. 261, 265 (1921).
1-19.;331 U.S. 145,154, 67iSup. Ct. 1098,1103 (1947).
120.; 275.'U.S. 192 48 Sup. Ct. 74 (1927) ; see also United States v. Boyette, 4th
Cir.;Jah 6, 1962, 30 U.S. LAw WaK 2375, petition for cert. filed sub nom. Mooring
v.'Uftit~d, States, 30' U.S. LAw Wrgx 3250 (U.S. Feb. 5, 1962) '(703).
1212'United State's v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 52 Sup. Ct. 420 (1932); accord,
Go-A5'ar importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S.344,51 Sup. Ct. ,153 (1931).
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In this case, however, the Court held that the search and seizure was
unlawful since the objects were of mere evidentiary value. The Court
distinguished the Marron case on the basis that the papers there seized
were used to carry on the unlawful business of selling liquor; they were
so closely related to the crime that in fact they were used to commit it. In
the instant case, on the other hand, the Court found that the papers seized
were intended to be used to solicit business, but were intrinsically un-
offending. These two cases serve to indicate the subtle and often imper-
ceptible distinctions which can cause this area to be most difficult to fully
comprehend. Nevertheless, there are numerous cases which more pointedly
illustrate the nature of the objects subject to seizure.
Thus, it is proper to search for and seize marked money which an
informer used to pay for narcotics,1 22 or even "clean" money for which the
defendant exchanged the marked money.1 23 It should be noted that money
itself is intrinsically unoffending and merely of evidentiary value, but in
the above cited cases the money was the fruit of the crime and was, there-
fore, subject to seizure.
Articles used for the commission of crime are similarly subject to
seizure; hence a National Labor Relations Board identification card and
a rubber stamp used to imprint "U. S. Bureau of Labor Relations" on
cards were properly seized from one charged with impersonating a federal
employee.12 4 The court in the same case, however, held that blank stock
certificates were not subject to seizure since they bore no relation to the
crime and were seized merely as evidence. When one is arrested for the
unlawful possession of drugs, morphine tablets can properly be seized
incident to the arrest as objects used to perpetrate the crime.125
While the aforementioned principles appear well established in theory
and practice, a fairly recent federal case appears to have established an
exception to the general rule. In Charles v. United States,12 the 9th
Circuit held that a search of the person arrested, even to find evidence of
a crime other than that for which he was lawfully arrested was proper.
The court reasoned that once an individual is subject to the dominion of,
the law by a valid arrest, a search of his person is lawful regardless of its
purpose. The court noted, however, that such an unlimited search of
anything but his person would be unlawful. Although the Supreme Court
has not .expressly stated a rule contrary to that expounded by the Charles
case, it would seem that such an exception is not in accord with the
principles articulated in the cases decided by the Court. To permit the
seizure of articles of mere evidentiary value because they are concealed
122. United States v. Dornblut, 261 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 360
U.S. 912, 79 Sup. Ct. 1298 (1959).
123. United States v. Lagow, 66 F. Supp. 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), aff'd 159 F.2d
245 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 858, 67 Sup. Ct. 1750 (1947).
124. Honig v. United States, 208 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1953).
125. Griffin v. State, 57 Okla. Cr. 176, 46 P.2d 382 (1935).
126. 278 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 831, 81 Sup. Ct. 46
(1960).
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on the person of the one arrested rather than on his dining room table is
to make a distinction where one does not, in fact, exist. The nature of the
object, rather than its location, appears to be the crucial factor in the cases
decided by the Supreme Court in this area. It is submitted that the Charles
case ignores the standard by which issues of this type are to be resolved.
VII.
FRUIT OP THE PoIsoNous TREE DOCTRINE.
While it is quite clear that evidence secured by an illegal search and
seizure will be suppressed upon proper motion by the defendant, it is
equally clear that legally seized evidence will also be suppressed if its
whereabouts were learned only through a previous unlawful search or
seizure. As the Court stated in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States:
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence
in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not
be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all. Of
course this does not mean that facts thus obtained become sacred and
inadmissible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent
source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained
by the Government's own wrong cannot be used by it . . .12
Thus, evidence derived from information gained during an illegal search
is treated as if the proffered evidence itself was the immediate product
of an illegal search and seizure and, as such, is inadmissible128 It is,
therefore, competent for the defendant to prove that the evidence sup-
porting his conviction was derived from an unlawful search and seizure,
i.e., it was a fruit of the poisonous tree; and the prosecution should
be given equal opportunity to prove that its proof had an independent
origin.129
It has been held that a search warrant is invalid when the facts
used to establish probable cause are obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment.'3 0 Of far-reaching impact are the holdings that one can-
not testify as to what he has observed during an unlawful arrest or
search. 131 Such decisions, stating that anything seen, heard or found
during an unlawful arrest or search is inadmissible regardless of the
manner in which it is presented, pose serious obstacles in the path of
law enforcement agencies. The prosecution runs the risk of having a
confession declared inadmissible because it was procured as the direct
127. 251 U.S. 385, 392, 40 Sup. Ct. 182, 183 (1920).
128. United States v. Krulewitch, 167 F.2d 943 (2d Cir. 1948); rev'd on other
grounds, 336 U.S. 440, 69 Sup. Ct. 716 (1949).
129. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 Sup. Ct. 266 (1939).
130. McGinnis v. United States, 227 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1955); Fraternal Order
of Eagles v. United States, 57 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1932).
131. Williams v. United States, 263 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959) cert. denied, 365
U.S. 836, 81 Sup. Ct. 751 (1961) ; McGinnis v. United States, supra note 130.
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result of an unlawful entry into the defendant's home, or an unlawful
arrest. It is not inconceivable that a form of the McNab b-Mallory rule,
applicable only in the federal courts, will soon be fashioned into a prin-
ciple of constitutional necessity binding upon the states. The coming
of such a declaration can be seen in the recent case of United Sates
v. Meachum13 2 where the court indicated that if an individual is arrested
and retained in custody without probable cause there is a violation of
the fourth amendment, and a confession obtained as a result of this
unlawful police action must be suppressed.1 3 3  It is submitted that
such extensions of the poisonous tree doctrine accord with logic and
theory. If one is arrested in a manner which violates his constitutional
rights, a confession procured as a result of such unlawful conduct is
indeed tainted with the aura of illegality. To allow the confession into
evidence would permit the prosecution to use knowledge gained by
its own wrong in utter disregard of the rule enunciated in the Silverthorne
case. This is not, in reality, an extreme position when one considers that
it has been held that a person found during an illegal search and seizure
is incompetent to testify.134
The Supreme Court, in Walder v. United States,1 3 5 carved an im-
portant exception out of the poisonous tree doctrine. In this case the
defendant, on trial for possessing narcotics, was asked on direct and cross
examinations if he had ever possessed narcotics and he answered in the
negative. The Court held that it was then proper for the prosecution
to call as a witness a police officer who had previously seized narcotics
from the defendant as a result of an unlawful search. The Court stated
that the defendant's assertions, on direct examination, that he had never
possessed narcotics, opened the door for testimony concerning the pre-
viously seized narcotics in order to attack his credibility.
VIII.
PROCZDURAL AsPmc'rs.
Of utmost concern to the practicing attorney is the procedure to
be followed in objecting to certain evidence on the ground that it was
secured by an unreasonable search and seizure. This problem has many
facets, encompassing the form of the objection, when it must be made,
whether the defendant is entitled to a jury determination on the issue
and the allocation of the burden of proof. As with most constitutional
rights, the privilege to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
can be waived, so it is exceedingly important that one be familiar with
the correct procedure.
132. 197 F. Supp. 803 (D.D.C. 1961).
133. See Nuelsein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d 690 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
134. People v. Albea, 2 Ill. 2d 317, 118 N.E.2d 227 (1954).
135. 347 U.S. 62, 74 Sup. Ct. 354 (1954).
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In Cogen v. United States, the Supreme Court stated the procedure
to be followed in the federal courts in the following language:
Hence, a defendant will, ordinarily, be held to have waived the
objection to the manner in which evidence has been obtained unless
he presents the matter for the consideration of the court reasonably
in advance of the trial; and he does this commonly by a motion
made in the cause for return of the property and for suppression of
the evidence. The rule is one of practice; and is not without ex-
ceptions.13 6
As the Court pointed out, the rule that the motion must be made
before trial is not without exception, and it has been held that the rule
is inapplicable if the defendant learns for the first time at the trial that
the prosecution has this evidence, and immediately moves to suppress it.187
The federal procedure is presently governed by Rule 41 (e) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure which, as a codification of the prior case
law, states in part:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move
• . . for the return of the property and to suppress for the use as
evidence anything so obtained . . . . The motion shall be made be-
fore trial or hearing unless opportunity therefor did not exist or
the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion, but the
court in its discretion may entertain the motion at the trial or the
hearing.
This Rule is plainly just, since it not only considers instances where
the defendant is ignorant of the unlawfulness of the search or seizure,
but also vests discretion in the court to preclude a patently unfair trial.
The state jurisdictions which had voluntarily adopted the exclu-
sionary rule prior to the Mapp decision have not been in agreement as
to the time at which a motion to suppress must be made. At least one
jurisdiction closely follows the federal procedure, 138 while other courts
permit a motion to suppress, or an ordinary objection, to be made when
the evidence is sought to be introduced at the trial. 189 In what appears
to be the first post-Mapp case in New York, the court stated that a
statutory rule along the lines of Rule 41(e), but granting the court a
wide range of discretion to entertain the motion at trial, should be
enacted.' 40 It is submitted that the federal practice should not be ig-
nored by those state courts which find themselves bound to the exclu-
sionary rule for the first time, and now must establish a procedure for
136. 278 U.S. 221, 223, 49 Sup. Ct. 118, 119 (1929).
137. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261 (1921) ; see Segurola
v. United States, 275 U.S. 106, 48 Sup. Ct. 77 (1927).
138. People v. Anderson, 337 111. 310, 169 N.E. 243 (1929).
139. People v. Berger, 44 Cal. 2d 459, 282 P.2d 509 (1955) ; Youman v. Com-
monwealth, 189 Ky. 152, 224 S.W. 860 (1920); State v. Wills, 91 W. Va. 659, 114
S.E. 261 (1922).
140. People v. Gonzales, 221 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1961).
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raising the constitutional issue. To permit the defendant to by-pass a
pre-trial procedure and object for the first time during the trial, when
the evidence is proffered, unnecessarily disrupts the adjudication of his
responsibility. The trial judge must then halt the proceedings and hold
a hearing to inquire into the validity of the defendant's claim. More-
over, the jury will have to be excused while this hearing is conducted. 14 1
Such chaos and confusion can easily be avoided by holding that defendant
waives his right to object, in the absence of exceptional circumstances,
unless he does so prior to trial.
As the defendant is the moving party when a motion to suppress
is made it would be expected that he has the burden of proving the
evidence was obtained by an unlawful search and seizure, and the cases
have so held. 142 Thus, when objects are seized under a regularly issued
search warrant the defendant must prove that the warrant was issued
without a showing of probable cause. 143
The cases are legion in asserting that the validity of an arrest,
search and seizure is a question for determination by the court rather
than the jury.144 In People v. Gorg, 145 Justice Traynor, in a well-reasoned
opinion, pointed out that the legality of the police conduct in question
will often depend on whether the officer had probable cause to act as
he did, and this in turn often depends on matters that would be inad-
missible at trial.146 It is, therefore, imperative that the jury not be charged
with the duty of sifting such evidence in order to resolve the issue. In
distinguishing the procedure followed in the confession cases, where the
jury can reject the court's determination that it was voluntarily given,
Justice Traynor recognized that the jury must be informed of the circum-
stances surrounding the confession. In the search and seizure cases, how-
ever, the probative value of the evidence does not depend on the legality of
the police action and, therefore, no purpose would be served by holding
argument before the jury on the motion to suppress and permitting a
second determination of the issue. It has been held prejudicial to the defen-
dant, amounting to reversible error, to permit testimony on the issue of
probable cause to be offered in the presence of the jury.147
141. In fra notes 144-147 and accompanying text.
142. Batten v. United States, 188 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1951); United States v.
Warrington, 17 F.R.D. 25 (N.D. Cal. 1955). See Priestly v. Superior Court, 50
Cal. 2d 812, 330 P.2d 39 (1958).
143. Batten v. United States, supra note 142.
144. Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 47 Sup. Ct. 531 (1927); Steele v,
United States, 267 U.S. .505, 45 Sup. Ct. 417 (1925); Ramirez v. United States, 294
F.2d 277, (9th Cir. 1961); Simmons v. United States, 206 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir.
1953); Kelly v. United States, 197 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1952); Burris v. United
States, 192 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1951).
145. 45 Cal. 2d 776, 291 P.2d 469 (1955).
146. E.g., hearsay, knowledge of prior criminal activity, reasonable basis for
suspicion, and knowledge derived from a reliable source.
147. Simmons v. United States, supra, note 144; cf. People v. Russell, 16 Cal.
Rptr. 228 (1961).
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The objection to evidence on the ground that it was obtained in
violation of the defendant's constitutional rights cannot be argued on
appeal if a motion to suppress was not made below.148 Notwithstanding
this principle, when a conviction is reversed on other grounds, all rights
the defendant originally possessed are reinstated, and the fact that a motion
to suppress was not made at the first or even second trial does not bar
such a motion at the trial on remand.1 49 Similarly, the trial court is not
bound by the determination of a pre-trial motion to suppress, and where it
becomes probable that there has been an unconstitutional search and seizure
it is the duty of the trial court to entertain an objection and decide the
question as then presented.' 50
Ix.
CONCLUSION.
Through interpretation of the fourth amendment the courts have
evolved general principles of search and seizure. In their efforts to
lay down "the Law" they have unfortunately overlooked the language
of the amendment itself. The proscription is phrased not in absolute
terms, but in relative terms; forbidding only "unreasonable" searches and
seizures. It is difficult to understand, for example, that under all cir-
cumstances it is proper to search a moving vehicle upon a showing of
probable cause. Surely the reader can imagine many situations when
such a search would be "unreasonable." It seems apparent that the
courts have equated unreasonable with unlawful, so that a search and
seizure is violative of the fourth amendment if it is unlawful, regardless
of the fact that it may be reasonable under the circumstances.
The nature of the problem, however, undoubtedly forced the courts
to the conclusion that ad hoc determinations would be unwise and serve
no useful purpose. Problems of search and seizure face police officers
daily, and it is necessary that the legal boundaries of their conduct be estab-
lished. The courts therefore were required to articulate principles of
general application which would assist the police and guide their future
conduct. Limited holdings, dealing only with the situation before the
court, would be of little value to police and bar since it is unusua"
for the precise set of facts to arise a second time. With this in mind
perhaps the courts properly enunciated general principles of search and
seizure, but as a consequence it appears safe to say that "reasonableness"
is not generally the standard by which police conduct is tested.
In Mapp v. Ohio'5 ' the Court decided one problem, but in so doing it
raised many others which it did not specifically answer. 52 By far the
148. United States v. Herskovitz, 209 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1954).
149. United States v. Watson, 146 F. Supp. 258 (D.D.C. 1956).
150. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261 (1921); Amos
v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 41 Sup. Ct. 266 (1921).
151. 367 U.S. 643, 81 Sup. Ct. 1684 (1961).
152. For a discussion of the problems created by Mapp see Broeder, The
Decline And Fall Of Wolf v. Colorado, 41 NEB. L. Rzv. 185, 204-17 (1961).
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most important issue left unresolved is whether the state courts are now
required to follow the federal cases decided under the fourth amendment. 15
To state it differently, are the state courts now bound by the interpre-
tation given the fourth amendment by the federal courts, or is the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment less stringent? The fact
situation in Mapp, involving a forcible and extensive search of a dwelling
without a warrant of any kind, is such that the suppression of the evidence
seized is not inconsistent with the argument that the search and seizure
were declared unconstitutional under the due process clause without the
use of federal standards established under the fourth amendment. How-
ever, there is language in the opinion which leads one to believe that in the
future the federal decisions will be binding upon the states.154
While several state jurisdictions have passed on questions of search
and seizure since Mapp, only one court has interpreted this decision as re-
quiring the state courts to follow established federal principles. 155 Other
jurisdictions appear to feel that the states are at liberty to fashion their
own law of search and seizure unencumbered by the federal case law. 56
It is obvious that the final arbiter of this discrepancy will have to be the
Supreme Court of the United States.
Lewis H. Gold
153. It seems clear that the state courts need not follow the federal procedure
governing the motion to suppress, but are free to adopt their own procedural re-
quirements. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,659, 81 Sup. Ct. 1684, 1693 note 9 (1961)
(emphasis supplied).
154. "This Court has not hesitated to enforce as strictly against the States as it
does against the Federal Government the rights of free speech and of a free
press, the rights to notice and to a fair trial, public trial, including as it does, the
right not to be convicted by use of a coerced confession, however logically relevant
it be, and without regard to its reliability. . . Why should not the same rule
apply to what is tantamount to coerced confession by way of unconstitutional
seizure of goods, papers, effects, documents, etc.?" Supra note 151 at 656, 81
Sup. Ct. at 1692. Again, at 658, 81 Sup. Ct. at 1693, the Court stated: "Federal-
state cooperation in the solution of crime under constitutional standards will be
promoted, if only by recognition of their now mutual obligation to respect the
same fundamental criteria in their approaches.". It is interesting to note that the
dissenting Justices feel the federal standards are now binding upon the States,
supra note 151 at 679-80, 81 Sup. Ct. at 1705, as do Mr. Justice Black and Mr.
Justice Douglas whose views on this issue are expressed in their concurring opinion
in Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property, 367 U.S. 717, 738, 81 Sup. Ct. 1708, 1720
(1961).
155. People v. Gonzales, 221 N.Y.S.2d 846, 848 (1961).
156. People v. McGhee, 16 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1961); People v. Tyler, 14 Cal.
Rptr. 610 (1961) ; State v. Chance, 176 A.2d 307 (N.J. Co. Ct. 1961).
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-DETERMINATION or ACCUSED'S
RIGHT To BAIL IN CAPITAL CASES.
The release of a person accused of a crime, pending final determination
of his guilt, upon the posting of a bail bond has been a traditional incident
of the administration of criminal justice at common law.' However, it was
not until the eighteenth century that any distinction based upon the nature
of the offense was articulated with respect to the availability of bail, although
such a delineation had been prevalent as regards the amount of a bond.2
The purpose of this comment is to explore the former distinction with an
emphasis on the procedural complexities which surround an application
for bail by a person accused of a capital offense.
I.
THE ORIGIN OF THE PROBLEM.
At common law, the grant of bail rested within the inherent discretion
of the court in all cases." Reference to bail in the Federal Constitution
is limited to the phrase, "Excessive bail shall not be required. . ... 4
Thus, the growth and refinement of the concept of bail has been in effect,
left to traditional legislative and judicial machinery. The desire of many
of the contemporary political scientists for a more detailed treatment of bail
provisions found its first expression in the constitution of the state of
Connecticut into which, in 1818, the following provision was incorporated:
All prisoners shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, except for capital offenses where the proof is evident or the
presumption great.5 [Emphasis added].
Since that time, thirty-eight states have adopted substantially the same
provision, 6 so that today in most jurisdictions there is an absolute right to
bail in all but capital cases. Four states have limited the sphere of cases
in which bail may be denied to those involving treason or first degree
murder,1 while four others have codified the discretionary common law
rule.8 Three other states still adhere to the traditional common law
approach without benefit of a statute,9 and the exact status of the law
1. 4 BLACKSTONP, COMMZNTARIES 298, 299 (4th ed. 1899); 2 HALs, PXXAs or
Tns CROWN (Ist Amer. ed. 1847).
2. Ibid.
3. Principe v. Ault, 62 F. Supp. 279 (D.C. Ohio 1945): State v. Rockafellow,
6 N.J.L. 332 (Sup. Ct. 1796). See also authorities cited in Note 1.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; See Carlion v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 72 Sup. Ct.
525 (1952) for a complete discussion of the development of the right of bail from
the basic provisions of the eight amendments.
5. CONN. CONST. art. I, § 14.
6. See Appendix I.
7. See Appendix II.
8. See Appendix III.
9. See Appendix IV.
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on this point in Alaska remains uncertain. 10 The rule which is applied in
the federal courts is embodied in Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure," and it has been administered in accordance with the view
prevailing in most of the state courts.' 2
The preceding collection of authorities indicates that the current status
of the law in over eighty percent of the states is that an application for
bail in a capital case will be denied if the proof that such a crime has
been committed by the accused is evident or the presumption great. This
proposition poses three important procedural questions:
(1) Who bears the burden of proving that the proof is evident or
the presumption great?
(2) What quantum of proof is necessary to satisfy that burden?
(3) What types of evidence may be submitted?
These three questions will be considered separately in order to facilitate
a better understanding of each. It is recognized, however, that there will
necessarily be some overlapping of issues and to that extent any division
is somewhat arbitrary.
II.
ALLOCATION OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF.
In attempting to analyze the patterns into which the cases allocating
the burden of proof tend to fall, it is helpful to keep in mind that the
concept of release on bond is an essential concomitant to the presumption
of innocence,' 8 which has been traditionally accorded the highest esteem
as a principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence.' 4 The framers of the
various state constitutional provisions were compelled to weigh against
the presumption of innocence, the recognition of the empirical fact that,
10. Comment, 70 YAIe L.J. 966, 969 (1961). Alaska apparently provides for
an absolute right to bail; however, this conclusion is subject to final judicial
interpretation of the rather vague provisions of the Alaska statute, Alaska Comp.
Law Ann. § 69-5-1 (1948).
11. "A person arrested for an offense not punishable by death shall be admitted
to bail. A person arrested for an offense punishable by death may be admitted to
bail by any court or judge authorized by law to do so in the exercise of discretion,
giving due weight to the evidence and to the nature and circumstances of the
offense." 18 U.S.C. § 3141 (1946).
12. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 72 Sup. Ct. 525 (1952). Mr. Justice Reed,
speaking for the majority, noted that the eighth amendment, like its English
predecessor, does not guarantee the right to bail in all instances; rather, it is
merely a safeguard to prevent excessive bail in the instances where it is properly
granted.
13. Ford v. Dilley, 174 Iowa 243, 156 N.W. 513 (1916) (this is the classic
American opinion in the area); State v. Konigsberg, 33 N.J. 367, 164 A2d 740
(1960). See also OamLD, CRIMINAL PRocEDuRE FROM AP.uST To Avpwl&A 104
(1947).
14. 4 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCaDUR § 1811 (1957).
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faced with a choice between risking his life -before a jury or forfeiting his
property, the natural urge of man is to choose the latter.15 Since the basic
purpose of bail is to insure the defendant's presence at trial, the authors
of the state constitutions apparently deduced that this urge disappears when
the facts adduced do not indicate a probable danger of conviction for a
capital offense. One might well consider whether the allocation of the
burden of proof made by the judicial tribunals is consistent with this de-
duction.16
The decisions 6n the allocation of the burden of proof in bail pro-
ceedings which are subsequent to indictment on a capital charge fall into
three fundamental categories.
The first line of cases holds that the state has the burden of introducing
sufficient facts, in addition to the indictment, to satisfy the court that
the constitutional requirements necessary for the denial of bail have been
met.17 This view is consistent with the application of the presumption of in-
nocence and is likewise consistent with the general mode of construction
of a constitutional mandate: the party asserting an exception to a con-
stitutional decree must prove that his case is properly within the ex-
ception.'6 In reply to the criticism that such a viewpoint places an
undue burden upon the state in exercising its duty of protecting society,
the adherents of this position reply that the state can satisfy its burden
without going into any great detail and that, moreover, this does not unduly
prejudice the state's case since it would invariably come forward at that
time anyway, in order to rebut the contentions defendant would make if
he had the burden of proof.'9
The second body of authority regards the indictment for a capital
crime as prima facie evidence of a capital case within the constitutional
exception; consequently, the burden is on the defendant to introduce
evidence which will convince the court that the proof that he committed a
15. An extensive discussion of the psychological factors inherent in the legal
process of release on bond may be found in State v. Williams, 30 N.J. 105, 125,
152 A.2d 9, 19 (1959).
16. There is some authority for the proposition that the presumption against
innocence completely subordinates all other considerations. E.g., Williamson v. United
States, 184 F.2d 280, 282 (2d Cir. 1950), in which Mr. Justice Jackson, sitting as a
circuit judge, said, "Imprisonment to protect society from predicated but uncon-
summated offenses is so unprecedented in this country and so fraught with danger
of excesses and injustice that I loath to resort to it."
17. Ford v. Dilley, 174 Iowa 243, 156 N.W. 513 (1916); Murray v. District
Court, 35 Mont. 504, 90 Pac. 513 (1807); State v. Kauffman, 20 S.D. 620, 108 N.W.
246 (1906).
18. "The state avers that the accused is guilty of a charged crime.... It certainly
does seem more natural that the one who affirms guilt, and that there is evidence
which makes the proof of guilt evident or the presumption thereof great, should, in the
first instance, be held to point out what the evidence is, rather than that the accused,
saying there is and should be no evidence, should go into the wide world in search of
that which he says does not and should not exist." State v. Konigsberg, 33 N.J.
367, 369, 164 A.2d 740, 744 (1960).
19. This argument is detailed in Commonwealth v. Stahl, 237 Ky. 338, 35 S.W.2d
563 (Ct. App. 1931).
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capital offense is not evidence and that the presumption of such is not
great.20 This rule must of necessity yield in states where the use of the
criminal information or the short form indictment has been adopted.2 1
Furthermore, the courts alone have been traditionally considered the com-
petent tribunals before which issues relating to bail were to be processed.22
This group of cases would, however, permit the ex parte determinations of
a grand jury to govern the bail determination.23 Reliance on the indict-
ment to establish a prima facie case also leads to a myriad of problems due
to the fact that a murder indictment very often fails to specify a degree
of murder, or else specifies the highest degree as a matter of course.24 The
most unique case in this line of authorities is that of Rigdon v. Florida25
in which the court required the accused "to take the initiative" and intro-
duce for the court's consideration not only his own witnesses but those of
the state as well, the names of the latter being listed on the indictment.
These cases minimize the importance of the presumption of innocence in
the bail area.
The final class of cases - a distinct minority - regard the indictment
for a capital offense as conclusive proof that the evidence is sufficient to
warrant a denial of bail.28 This rule undermines the presumption of inno-
cence and permits the final decision on the availability of bail to rest with a
body of laymen who are unaware that the issue of bail is before them. The
theory was apparently derived from the old English case of Rex v. Dalton,2 7
which was based on the rationale that the evidence used in formulating
an indictment was secret and hence no step should be taken which would
in any way impugn the indictment. This rationale is no longer valid since
20. Webb v, State, 50 So.2d 541 (Ala. 1951) ; State v. Hedges, 177 Ind. 589, 98
N.E. 417 (1912); State v. Tetter, 65 Nev. 584, 200 P.2d 657 (1948); Ex Parte
Landers, 110 Tex. Cr. 604, 9 S.W.2d 1106 (Tex. Crim. App. 1928).
21. The short form indictment is nothing more than a formal statement of
the charge. State v. Konigsberg, 33 N.J. 367, 164 A.2d 740 (1960).
22. ORFILD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURT FROM ARREST To APPEAL 106 (1947).
23. State v. Konigsberg, 33 N.J. 367, 164 A2d 740 (1960). However, the best
rebuttal available to such criticism is found in a dictum in the case of Ford v.
Dilley, 174 Iowa 243, 156 N.W. 513 (1916) (a case generally cited by those who
would place the burden of proof on the state). It was there stated that minutes of
the grand jury hearings are competent evidence in bail proceedings since they are
"solemn court records."
24. Matter of Corbo, 54 N.J. Super. 575, 149 A.2d 828 (1959). This case re-
views all of the authorities and marshals all of the arguments relating the treatment
of murder as a single crime which is divisible into degrees only for purposes
of punishment. It then registers general adherence to that principle but departs
from it in the bail cases, since the type of punishment is one of the prime factors
underlying the bail provisions of the New Jersey Constitution. Contrast this with
Rogers v. State, 30 Ala. App. 226, 4 So. 2d 266 (1941) under which the accused upon
indictment for murder was "presumed to be guilty in the highest degree."
25. 41 Fla. 308, 26 So. 711 (1899). The accused was permitted to cross examine
the State's witnesses despite the fact that he was compelled to introduce them.
26. State v. Butler, 3 So. 350 (La. 1888) ; State v. Diehl, 115 Ohio St. 454, 154
N.E. 726 (1926). Cf. State ex rel Sheriff v. Rice, 135 So. 64 (Miss. 1929) which
categorically states, in dicta, "Criminal jurisprudence has long since settled the rule
that an indictment furnishes absolute evidence that the proof is evident or the
presumption great."
27. 2 Strange 911 (1703). See also CHITTY, CRIMINAL LAW 111, 128, 129 (1913).
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grand jury evidence can be obtained freely by the courts.28 This rule, where
it still exists, would seem destined to eventual repudiation.
There is one problem which looms large under all of the aforementioned
theories, namely, the definition and proof of the existence of a capital
crime. Most courts will agree on the following definition of a capital crime:
One for which the death penalty may be inflicted, but need not necessarily
be.29 In order to ascertain whether the courts in fact adhere to this
definition in bail cases, we must examine the concurrent question of what
evidence the courts will accept as sufficient to prove that the alleged
offense is capital.
The problem becomes acute in states which permit indictment on a
general charge of murder. Matter of Corbo80 involved a situation in which
indictment for "murder generally" was returned by the grand jury, but at
the bail hearings the evidence presented by the state was relevant only to
second degree murder. The court held that all murder cases are not auto-
matically within the constitutional exception simply because capital punish-
ment is possible. "The probable imposition of such a penalty by way of a
first degree murder verdict must be shown." This is an obvious departure
from our definition of a capital crime. The same result is achieved in-
directly by emphasizing the necessity of establishing the existence of a
crucial factor which would characterize the homicide as murder in the first
degree, for example, premeditation."1 Contrast these decisions with that of
Rogers v. State, 2 which held that one charged with murder is presumed
to be accused of the highest degree of the offense, and one may conclude
that it is not feasible to speak of a generic definition of a capital crime,
even in the restricted area of bail applications. Although the classic defini-
tion is more likely to appear in those states which give some presumptive
effect to the indictment, the only sound solution for the practitioner is to
research local precedent.8 8
A case will remain "capital" for bail purposes after conviction and
pending appellate review, despite the fact that a lesser sentence has been
28. E.g. Ford v. Dilley, 174 Iowa 243, 245, 156 N.W. 513, 514 (1916).
29. E.g. BLACK, LAW DIC'rXONARY. Cf. Lee v. State, 31 Ala. App. 91, 13 So.2d
583 (1943).
30. 54 N.J. Super. 575, 149 A2d 828 (1959). Accord, State ex rel Freeman v.
Kelly, 86 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1956).
31. Ex parte Simpson, 37 N.M. 453, 24 P.2d 291 (1932).
32. 30 Ala. App. 226, 4 So.2d 266 (1941).
33. This, too, may result in frustration, as an examination of the Pennsylvania
precedents will illustrate Commonwealth ex rel Condello v. Ingham, 54 Pa. D.&C.
253 (1945) held that the state in a case involving a "malicious crime" need not prove
the degree of the crime in order to come within the constitutional exception (but
note the strong dissenting opinion). In coritrast to this Lawrence County -precedent,
consider the decision of the Lackawanna County court in Commonwealth v. Manley,
60 Pa. D.&C. 194 (1947). This' case expressly repudiates Condello and holds that
the party bearing the burden of proof must specifically establish the probability of
first degree murder. It is also interesting to note that both opinions purport to rely
on the same two ancient precedents in order to support their conflicting positions:
Matter of Lemley, 2 Pitts. 362 (1862); Chauncey v. Keeper of the Prison, 2 Ash-
mead 227 (1838).
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imposed.3 4 Many states have codified this rule so as to provide that bail
should not be granted after conviction of any offense in capital cases.3 5
If the appellate court reverses a conviction and remands for a new trial,
the fact that the sentence imposed in the first trial was life imprisonment
does not automatically remove the case from the non-bailable category.30
However, if the ground for reversal is insufficient evidence, bail was gener-
ally granted pending retrial on the theory that the reversal indicates that the
death penalty will not be inflicted.37 The tenuous nature of this rationale
was subjected to severe criticism; this produced a notable modification,
and now bail will be denied if competent evidence indicates that the death
penalty will be inflicted upon retrial.38 The general rule is subject to
complete circumvention by means of a liberal interpretation of the phrase
"competent evidence". 89 In those jurisdictions which have abolished
capital punishment, bail is mandatory in all cases before conviction, 40 but
in post-conviction cases bail still remains discretionary in accordance with
general practice. 41
III.
THE QUANTUM OP EVIDENcE NECESSARY TO SATISFY
THE BURDEN OF PROOF.
Unlike the cases concerning the allocation of the burden of proof,
the decisions dealing with the quantum of evidence sufficient to comply
with that burden are incapable of any discernible categorization. The
cases again reflect the vexatious search for a reconciliation between
the desire to heed the classic presumption of innocence and the aversion
34. People v. St. Lucia, 315 I1. 258, 146 N.E. 183 (1925); State v. Barone,
96 N.J.L. 374, 114 Atl. 809 (1921); Ex parte Herndon, 18 Okla. Cr. 68, 192 Pac.820 (1920). Contra, Walker v. State, 138 Ark. 517, 209 S.W. 86 (1919).
35. Ark. Dig. Stat. § 2958 (Moses and Crawford) 1821; Colo. Comp. Laws§ 7113 (1921); Del. Rev. Code § 3980 (1915) ; Fla. Rev. Stat. § 6151 (1920);
Ind. Ann. Stat. § 2386 (Burns 1926); Iowa Code §13610 (1924); Ky. Code Crim.
Proc. § 75 (Carroll 1927); S. C. Code of Laws § 21 (1922). Louisiana has
embodied in its constitution a similar provision. LA. Co NS'. art. I, § 12.
36. Ex parte Howard, 99 Tex. Crim. App. 456, 270 S.W. 550 (1925). See
collection of authorities in 19 A.L.R. 807 (1922). A de novo determination of the
availability of bail will be made pending the second trial. But see State v. Williams,
30 N.J. 105, 152 A.2d 9 (1959). In the latter case defendant was indicted and
tried for first degree murder but was convicted of second degree murder. On
appeal, the conviction was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial; how-
ever, under state law retrial on the charge of first degree murder would constitute
double jeopardy. Held, defendant had a right to bail. The constitutional exception
did not apply because accused could not be constitutionally convicted of a crime
for which the loss of his life would be the penalty.
37. Ex parte Westcott, 57 Cal. App. 4, 270 Pac. 247 (1928); Ex parte Davis,
28 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 1930).
38. Ex parte Berwick, 33 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. Crim. App. 1930).
39. Cofer v. Henderson, 131 So. 421 (Miss. 1930).
40. Ex parte Ball, 106 Kan. 536, 188 Pac. 424 (1920).
41. In re Welisch, 18 Ariz. 517, 520, 163 Pac. 264, 265 (1917). See also, cases
collected in Anno. 19 A.L.R. 807 (1922).
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to releasing the accused perpetrator of a heinous crime. This reconcilia-
tion was difficult in the area of allocation of the burden of proof; it becomes
almost futile when linked with the delicate determination of what amount
of proof will satisfy that burden after it has been allocated. Although the
validity of any generalization would be, to say the least, dubious, the
following proposition might hazardously be proposed as a point of de-
parture: Those jurisdictions which emphasize the presumption of evidence
and place the burden of proof upon the state are more likely to demand
a stringent standard of proof,42 whereas those states which place the burden
of proof upon the defendant generally formulate a liberal standard so as to
mitigate the original burden.43
The variations of and exceptions to the aforementioned generalization
are innumerable, and the requisite quantum of proof is likely to be altered
to meet the exigencies which a particular state may attach to some other
procedural norm. 44 On the other hand, it has not been uncommon for a
court to assume the harsh and uncompromising position that the defen-
dant not only bears the burden of proof, but also that all doubts are
resolved against him. 45  There is also a trend toward phrasing the
test in terms of whether a trial court would be justified in sustaining a
verdict of first degree murder.46 It can be argued, however, that such a
test invades the determination of the ultimate issue since it, in effect, is
based upon the concept of reasonable doubt. Any attempt to deduce a
verbal formula expressing both a qualitative and quantitative evidentiary
standard seems doomed to failure. The most feasible approach would seem
to be to appraise the general attitude of each jurisdiction on the basis of
their disposition on the burden of proof and then to regulate the quantum
of sustaining evidence accordingly.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, pursuant to its policy of re-examin-
ing and reevaluating all precedents established prior to its Court Reorgani-
zation Plan of 1947, made an exhaustive study of bail applications incident
to capital crimes in an attempt to formulate a clear and exact statement of
the necessary quantum of proof.47  After reviewing more than twenty
different versions of the standard of proof, ranging from the palpably
42. Pair v. State, 32 Ala. App. 90, 22 So.2d 100 (1945) (beyond a reasonable
doubt); Ex parte Verden, 291 Mo. 552, 237 S.W. 734 (1922) (proof should "tend
strongly" to show the guilt of a capital crime).
43. Ex parte Frey, 85 Okla. Cr. 198, 187 P.2d 253 (1947) held that petitioner
satisfied his burden on the basis of his own testimony that he acted in self-defense in
inflicting a mortal wound upon another, at least where the essential facts before the
court were undisputed.
44. In Commonwealth v. Stahl, 237 Ky. 388, 35 S.W.2d 563 (1931), the court
in replying to the criticism that it was excessively liberal in imposing the burden of
proof upon the state said that the state could "easily fulfill its burden without going
into any great detail."
45. State v. Tetter, 65 Nev. 584, 200 P.2d 657 (1948). "The court shall
refuse bail if all of the evidence tends to indicate guilt of a capital offense or if the
evidence is substantially conflicting."
46. Ex parte Simpson, 37 N.M. 453, 24 P.2d 291 (1933).
47. State v. Konigsberg, 33 N.J. 367, 164 A.2d 740 (1960).
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negligible 48 to the exceedingly strict,49 the court announced a criterion
for determining when bail can be refused: "[W]hen the circumstances dis-
closed indicate a fair likelihood that the defendant is in danger of a jury
verdict of first degree murder." 50 (Emphasis added). Although this test
falls far short of achieving any mathematical exactitude, it is perhaps the
most lucid and logical verbalism yet proposed, for it clearly repudiates both
of the definable extremes and yet leaves a degree of latitude which will
enable each forum to mold a standard test suited to its own particular
theory of criminal administration. Furthermore, this opinion elucidates the
basic but often inarticulate consideration which underlies any attempt to
fix a quantum of proof in the area, viz., avoidance of any pre-trial determi-
nation of the ultimate innocence or guilt of the prisoner.51 Since any
resolution of direct conflicts between incriminating and exculpatory testi-
mony might well produce such improper effects, the standard of proof
must of necessity retain some flexibility. To the extent that a detailed
evaluation of the evidence is made, the bail proceeding will usually exceed
its proper perspective. 2 Simplification of the necessary quantum of evi-
dence will also reduce the length of bail proceedings, permit the judiciary
to devote more time to their trial work, and prevent conversion of the bail
hearing into an unsanctioned pre-trial criminal discovery procedure.
There are undoubtedly nunerous opinions in this area which do not
reflect any of the aforementioned considerations; those opinions have served
only to obscure the more salient factors relevant to bail proceedings."
They represent ad hoc determinations of the facts immediately before the
respective courts; the value judgments made are explained by verbal
formulae whose subsequent effects are not considered.
IV.
THE MANNER IN WHICH EVIDENCE Is PRESENTED.
The general procedure for the presentation of evidence relevant to a
bail application is exactly the same as that employed in any plenary
48. The state should make "some showing" that would bring the case within
the constitutional exception. State ex rel Murray v. District Court, 35 Mont. 504,
90 Pac. 513 (1907).
49. The evidence should make it "clear to the understanding and satisfactory
to the judgment" that the requisite burden of proof was met. In re Haigler, 15
Ariz. 150, 137 Pac. 423 (1913).
50. State v. Konigsberg, 33 N.J. 367, 375, 164 A.2d 740, 745 (1960). (Emphasis
added.)
51. "It is essential that the proceeding be kept in proper perspective as apreliminary one; one which should not and cannot be allowed in any way to bear
upon or influence the ultimate outcome of the plenary trial or the evaluation of
the resulting verdict." State v. Konigsberg, supra note 50.
52. In Ex parte Ray, 86 Tex. Crim. 582, 218 S.W. 504 (1928), the state was
required to come forth with almost its entire case including eyewitnesses, investi-
gators, and expert medical testimony in the bail proceeding. Contrast State v.
Konigsberg, 33 N.J. 367, 164 A.2d 740 (1960) in which the court noted that the
testimony of one or two principal witnesses will generally suffice. There is no need
to go into any detail and very often the defendant's confession may itself be sufficient.
53. E.g., Jordan v. State, 25 Ariz. 249, 215 Pac. 926 (1923) ; Ex parte
Perkins, 40 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Crim. App. 1931).
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criminal trial. 54 Both sides may produce real and testimonial evidence to
whatever extent they consider necessary, with due regard for the nature
of the proceeding. The normal rules of evidence apply, within the frame-
work of the prevailing burden of proof peculiar to the jurisdiction, and
each party may cross examine his adversary's witnesses. There will be an
occasional departure from the stereotype preliminary hearing, such as the
Florida court's promulgation of the "defendant's initiative" doctrine, under
which the accused is required to introduce those witnesses for the state
whose names appear on the indictment as well as his own witnesses,55 but
such excursions are rare indeed. There is, however, an old New Jersey
decision in which the testimony produced before a coroner's jury was used
as the basis of a bail determination for a person accused of a capital crime.56
There is also a small group of cases dispersed intermittently through
several jurisdictions, but holding exclusive sway in none, which permit
the matter to be submitted on the basis of affidavits or depositions.57 The
only procedural precedent for such proceedings is derived from rather
antiquated equity cases which were argued on a documentary basis, but
that practice has since been repudiated through the modernization of equity
practice.58 While this type of procedure in bail petitions has been ignored
in the recent cases, 59 there is authority supporting it which the criminal
practitioner should be aware of.
A dictum in the classic case of Ford v. Dilley6" which referred to the
district attorney as an officer of the court, led some jurisdictions to permit
the state to present its contentions in a bail proceeding by introducing the
indictment accompanied by positive representations by the prosecution as
to the evidence it would introduce at the trial.61 The rationale behind this
procedure is that the prosecutor is an officer of the court upon whom
serious consequences would devolve should he make any wilful misrepre-
sentations. In addition to being very flimsy evidence upon which to base
pre-trial incarceration, the validation of such a procedure would reduce
the burden of proof to nothingness in jurisdictions where it rests upon the
state. Konigsberg repudiated this procedure on the ground that the state-
54. Ford v. Dilley, 174 Iowa 243, 156 N.W. 513 (1916); Ex parte Verden,
291 Mo. 552, 237 S.W. 734 (1922).
55. Rigdon v. Florida, 41 Fla. 308, 26 So. 711 (1899). The constitutionality of
such procedure was never raised and the subsequent Florida decisions are consistent
with the principles of a general adversary proceeding. Ex parte Tully, 70 Fla. 1,
66 So. 296 (1914).
56. State v. Smith, 14 N.J.L. 300 (0 & T 1891).
57. Ex parte McAnally, 53 Ala. 495 (1875) ; State v. Kuchler, 3 N.J. Misc.
636, 129 At. 632 (Sup. Ct. 1925) ; State v. Goldstein, 41 N.J.L. 71 (0 & T 1917).
58. Cook, The Powers of Courts of Equity, 15 CoLum. L. Rzv. 37, 106 (1915).
59. State v. Konigsberg, 33 N.J. 367, 164 A.2d 740 (1960), drained much of the
vitality of the Kuchler and Goldstein cases, supra note 57.
60. 174 Iowa 243, 156 N.W. 513 (1916).
61. This was the procedure used by the lower courts in State v. Konigsberg,
33 N.J. 367, 164 A.2d 740 (1960). The appellate court rejected this procedure and
remanded the case for presentation in accordance with normal trial practice. See also
Ex Parte Decker, 37 Okla. Crim. 105, 257 Pac. 332 (1927).
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ments of the prosecutor would be hearsay statements "which could not be
accorded the probative significance sufficient to justify confinement pending
trial."'62 The possibility that this type of procedure will ever achieve any
significant acceptance is at best negligible.
Among those states which place the burden of proof upon the state
and give no presumptive value to the indictment, there is a diversion of
opinion as to what weight, if any, should be accorded the indictment.68
It would seem, however, that this quarrel is academic since the judge who
presides at the bail hearing knows that the defendant was indicted and
cannot expunge the obvious from his mind. One would expect the real
conflict to center around the admission of the minutes of the grand jury,
since they are fraught with the same defects which militated against giving
any presumptive force to the indictment. However, the admissibility of
these records has been tacitly accepted in view of the dicta in Ford v.
Dilley. 4 It is also interesting to note that despite the admonition not to
evaluate the evidence presented at a bail hearing in a capital case, the courts
will very often, and perhaps of necessity, make such an evaluation, as con-
sideration of the following examples will illustrate. The defendant's own
testimony to the effect that a homicide was either accidental 65 or committed
in self-defense 6 has been regarded as sufficient to remove the accused from
the bail prohibition provision, whereas the uncorroborated testimony of a
thirteen year old girl as to the occurrence of a rape was not regarded as
sufficient evidence on which to premise a denial of bail. 67
The courts have exhibited a general tendency to make bail hearings
as expeditious as possible; consequently, they are seldom receptive to the
introduction of any issue not directly related to the particular bail determi-
nation immediately before it. Deaver v. State8 depicts this attitude. This
case arose in a state in which the indictment constituted prima facie
evidence of the facts necessary for a denial of bail. The defendant sought
to claim that the indictment was fraudulent in that it was returned by a
grand jury which did not have any evidence of the alleged crime before it.
The court refused to hear the defendant's argument on the ground that
this can properly be raised at trial on a motion to quash, rather than
during a specialized preliminary hearing.
62. 33 N.J. 367, 379, 164 A.2d 740, 749 (1960). But see State v. Teeter, 65Nev. 584, 593, 200 P2d 657, 663 (1948), where the court validated as "proper and
relevant" a process whereby the defense called the district attorney to the stand
and elicited a response to the question of whether his office had any evidence to
support the charge of first degree murder. The court distinguished inquiries
relating to the nature of the evidence from those seeking a detailed recitation
thereof; the latter they would disallow as hearsay.
63. State v. Koester, 5 Del. 258, 162 Att. 513 (1931). See also Comment, 70
YALz L.J. 966, 973 (1961).
64. 174 Iowa 243, 156 N.W. 513 (1916).
65. State v. Teeter, 65 Nev. 584, 200 P.2d 657 (1948).
66. Ex parte Frey, 85 Okla. Crim. 198, 187 P.2d 253 (1947).
67. Ex parte Hawthorn, 148 Tex. Crim. 576, 189 S.W.2d 1021 (1945).
68. 135 So. 604 (Ala. 1931).
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V.
PROCEEDINGS IN COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS.
The seven states69 which adhere to the traditional concept that their
judicial officers have complete discretion in the issuing and setting of bail
are primarily occupied with a process of balancing a number of relevant
factors and ascertaining the weight of each, at the end of which they hope
to reach a decision on both the availability and the amount of bail. 0 The
factors which are relevant to their decision on the availability of bail in a
capital case are the same factors used by other states in setting the amount
of a bond once it is agreed that bail will issue, but the weight to be
accorded to the nature of the crime is the crucial variable in the former
situation.71 Thus, even in these jurisdictions the court is once again faced
with the basic policy determination of whether to stress the presumption
of innocence or the duty to protect society from a potentially dangerous
assailant. The weight accorded to the nature of the crime in a bail determi-
nation will directly reflect the resolution of the aforementioned dichotomy.
In addition to the nature of the crime the following factors are also relevant
to the determination of the various bail issues discussed above: the
character of the accused, his past criminal record, the mode of apprehension
and accused's reaction thereto, the reputation of the accused in the com-
munity, the existence of any strong community ties of the accused, and the
likelihood of his guilt.1 2 The inclusion of the final factor injects many of the
problems previously discussed into the common law states in addition the
general complexities already present in the "balancing" concept; however,
the probability of guilt is relegated to just another factor to be con-
sidered rather than the crucial factor on which the issuance of bail will
ultimately hinge.
VI.
CONCLUSION.
The formulation of procedural norms for the determination of the
issuance of a bail bond in any type of case should be correlated with, and
to a substantial extent, governed by the presumption of innocence. Conse-
quently, the burden of proving that a particular application for bail is
69. See Appendices III and IV.
70. ORPIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST To APPEAL 106, 113 (1947).
Cf. Mendenhall v. Sweet, 117 Fla. 659. 158 So. 280 (1934).
71. Morse and Beattie, A Survey of The Administration of Criminal Justice, 11
ORE. L. Rev. 1, 101-07 (1932); Comment, 70 YALE L.J. 966 (1961). The latter
article contains an excellent historical study of the bail system.
72. See authorities collected in notes 70 and 71. In regard to the financial
mechanics of the process of setting the amount of bail see Foote, Compelling
Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. Rzv.
1031 (1954). The author treats at great length the method of denying bail to the
accused through the establishment of an exhorbitant figure, a method employed
under the procedural guise set down to effectuate the guarantee of bail to the
accused.
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subject to denial because of the existence of evident proof of a capital
crime should rest with the state, just as the burden of establishing the
actual guilt will rest with it at the trial. Although generically the presump-
tion of innocence should apply at every stage of the proceedings, one can
rationally accept the more frequent denial of bail after conviction of a
capital crime and pending appeal, because the possibility that society will
be subjected to a recurrence of so serious a perversion is sufficiently strong
to overcome the presumption of innocence in this specific context. How-
ever, in pre-trial bail cases the accused should have the full benefit of that
presumption; the courts should not permit the emotional outbursts of the
public to distort this basic concept of criminal justice before, during, or
after trial.78 The accordance of any presumptive effect to an indictment on
the issue of whether bail should be granted unduly restricts the operation
of the presumption of innocence on the strength of a bill which reflects in
no degree whatsoever any consideration or disposition of the bail issue.
To accord such an indictment conclusive effect is to deny the very exist-
ence of the concept of presumed innocence and is a complete perversion of
the criminal process.74
The historical development of bail procedure in capital cases serves
to highlight the need for greater refinement among our judicial tribunals
of the quantum or standard of proof necessary to support a denial of bail.
Due consideration must be given to the preliminary nature of the bail
proceeding in the formulation of this standard so as to avoid any prejudicial
reflection upon the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence and to prevent the
bail hearing from deteriorating into an unauthorized method of pre-trial
discovery. The standard best suited to serve this end is one which requires
the presentation of more than a scintilla of evidence and less than the
amount necessary to establish a prima facie case of guilt at trial. This
will afford due protection to both the individual defendant and to society
as a whole. The problem of fixing an exact standard by which the avail-
ability of bail in a capital case may be tested is just another facet of the
conflict between the rights of the individual and the best interests of society.
In this context the presumption of innocence compels a resolution favorable
to the individual which is ultimately beneficial to society since individual
freedom must be the basis of collective strength.
John S. Fields
73. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 72 Sup. Ct. 1 (1951) emphasizes the importance of
the presumption of innocence in the American system of criminal justice and discusses
its applicability to our bail system.
74. State v. Crocker, 5 Wyo. 385, 40 Pac. 681 (1895) raises serious doubts as
to the constitutionality of this procedure but the United States Supreme Court has
not yet been presented with the question.
COMMENTS
43
Editors: Comments
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1962
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX OF STATE LAWS GOVERNING THE RIGHT TO BAIL
I
The following thirty-eight states have adopted, either by constitutional provision
(thirty-six) or by statute (two), the generally prevalent bail provision set forth in
the text:
ALA. CONST. art. I, § 16; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 22; ABx. CONST. art. II,
§ 3; CAL. CONS?. art. I, § 6; CoL. CONST. art. II, § 19; CONN. CONST. art. I,§ 14; Dct.. CONST. art. I, § 12; FLA. DECLAATION oF RIGHTS § 9; HAWAII RZv.
LAWS § 256-3 (1955); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 6; ILL. CONST. art. II, § 7; IowA
CONST. art. I, § 12; KAN. CONST. BnL oF RIGHTS § 9; Ky. CONST. § 16; LA. CONST.
art. I, § 12; M1. CONST. art. I, § 10; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7; MIss. CONST.
art. III, § 29; Mo. CONST. art. II, § 24; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 19; N. H. Rzv.
STAT. ANN. § 597: 1 (1955); N. D. CONST. art. I, § 6; Ngv. CONST. art. I, § 7;
N. J. CONST. art. I, § 11; N. M. CONST. art. II, § 13; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 9;
OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 8; PA. CONST. art. I, § 14; R. I. CONST. art. I, § 9;
S. C. CONST. art. I, § 20; S. D. CONST. art. VI, § 8; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 15;
Tsx. CONST. art. I, § 11; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 8; VT. CONST. Ch. II, § 32;
WASH. CONS?. art. I, § 20; Wis. CONST. art. I, § 8; WYo. CONST. art. I, § 14.
II
The following four states limit the power to deny bail to cases of either treason
or murder:
IND. CONST. art. I, § 17; MICH. CONST. art. II, § 14; NxB. CONS?. art. I, § 9;
ORZ. CONST. art. I, § 14.
III
Three states grant an absolute right to bail only in cases involving misdemeanors,
applying the common law rule in all others:
GA. Cove ANN. § 27-901 (1953); MD. CoDS ANN. art. 52, § 13(b) (1951);
N. Y. CODE CiM. PRAc. § 553.
IV
There are four jurisdictions which adhere to the strict common law practice
of allowing judicial officers complete discretion in issuing and setting bail:
MASS. ANN. LAWS Ch. 276, § 42 (1956); N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-102 (1953);
VA. CODE ANN. § 19-88 to § 19-50 (1950); W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 6152.
LABOR LAW-THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD'S
PURSUIT OF THE RUNAWAY SHOP.
Unquestionably, one of the most drastic economic weapons in manage-
ment's arsenal, for use in their battles with labor unions, is the runaway
shop.' This is the device whereby an employer either prevents unionization
or escapes bargaining with an established union, by ceasing operations at his
original location and relocating in another, usually distant, community.
2
This tactic is an updated version, in effect, of another famous (or in-
famous) employer economic weapon, the lockout.3 It is the aim of this
comment to analyze, in light of the National Labor Relations Act,4 the
legal enigmas created by a runaway shop.
1. 41 CoLUM. L. Rev. 329 (1941).
2. 2 CCH Lab. L. Rep. 4090 (1961).
3. Ibid.
4. (Wagner Act) 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended by 61 Stat. 136 (1947),
and 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1959).
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I.
BACKGROUND.
A.
Movement Trends of U.S. Industry.
In recent years a trend has arisen whereby many businesses are
moving from large industrial complexes to smaller less developed com-
munities.5 As a result, relocation has become not only an important factor
in American social life, but also a serious economic problem to the
many states which are losing vital industries.6 The trend has been
strongest in industries, such as textiles,7 in which labor cost is the greater
part of the overall operational expense.8 Industries such as these which
do not require high capital outlays have the greatest mobility, 9 since
moving does not confront them with expenses and practical difficulties
involved in the relocation of heavier industry.
Although the Midwest and Pacific Coast have received some share of
relocating industry, the South has been the principal beneficiary.' 0 This
area has provided a warm climate for business, as well as for the tourist."
The favorable business climate is a result of more rapidly growing and
more readily available markets, greater development room, and other
natural inducements that have made the area conducive to certain busi-
nesses. 12 Also, the South, like other less industrialized parts of the country,
has further stimulated relocation by offering artificial inducements, such
as tax concessions, public utility benefits, low rentals on plant sites, and
various other reductions of overhead costs.18  Of all factors motivating
relocation, however, the one most often decisive is the availability of
cheaper non-unionized labor ;14 the South, a favorite asylum for relocating
industries, is certainly less receptive to union organization than other parts
of the country.'5 The present movement trend in U.S. industry is, at least
in part, a reaction to the upsurge of union strength in industrialized areas
5. U.S. News and World Report, Dec. 21, 1959, p. 87-90.
6. The Saturday Evening Post, April 9, 1960, p. 10.
7. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Productivity of Labor-Cotton Garment Industry,
Bull. No. 662 (1938). For the effect of this trend on the Pennsylvania textile
industry see 34 TEMP. L.Q. 136 (1961).
8. 5 W. Rts. L. Rxv. 84 (1953); 36 COLUM. L. Rv. 776 (1936).
9. Ibid.
10. U.S. News and World Report, supra note 5; The Saturday Evening Post,
supra note 6; The industrial East has been the big loser. 34 TEMP. L.Q. 136
(1961).
11. Ibid.
12. U.S. News and World Report supra note 5; The Saturday Evening Post,
supra note 6; Bureau of Labor Statistics supra note 7; see also 34 TEMP. L.Q. 136
(1961).
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid; 5 W. Rss. L. Rxv. 84 (1953).
15. In the South, unions are opposed by the pulpit, press, and public. Time
Sept. 22, 1961, p. 23.
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during the last thirty years. 16 Therefore, it is not surprising to find that
relocation has come to have important significance in labor-management
relationships.
B.
The Inevitable Clash of Interests Involved in Relocation.
Both employers and unions have a great deal at stake in any decision
concerning relocation.
Obviously, the employer has both economic and practical interests
to be considered. 1 7 The union's interest is equally clear; it desires to pro-
tect the job security of the employees it represents, and perhaps even
more important, its own very existence.' 8 It is the clash of these interests
which creates the legal battle of the runaway shop.
The justification for allowing an employer to relocate without union
interference rests on the acknowledged free enterprise concept that the
operation of a.business is the prerogative of management alone.19 If this
position were sustained in toto, an employer could thwart unionization
anytime he was willing to accept the burdens accompanying relocation.2
0
Even if the employer were not willing to go to the trouble of moving, he
could still use the threat of this economic club to create an anti-union
climate among his employees. 2 '
On the other hand, the union claims it can prevent an employer from
relocating, since such a move would frustrate the union's statutory right
to organize and bargain, free from the employer's interference. 22 To fully
accept this view would lead to a sharp curtailment of an employer's right
to operate his business as. he sees fit, and put one of the normal preroga-
tives of management at the mercy of the union.23
Adoption of the employer's rationale may produce a result that will
destroy the statutory rights of a union; yet, acceptance of the union's
reasoning may lead to a conclusion which would be alien to the still viable
American free enterprise system. Since a harsh result will flow from the
adoption of either alternative, the proper solution must be sought some-
16. The relocation trend appears to parallel the increase in unionism during
this period. 36 COLUm. L. Rxv. 776 (1936) ; Time, Sept. 22, 1961, p. 22.
17. 34 Tmp. L.Q. 136 (1961) ; 5 W. Rls. L. Rgv. 84 (1953).
18. Ibid.
19. Even with the advent of modern labor legislation, this management right is
still recognized by the courts. However, the right is restricted to the extent that
it cannot be used to accomplish illegal labor objectives. Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 61 Sup. Ct. 845 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct. 615 (1937).
20. This was the situation at common law.
21. This tactic has been used by employers in attempts to dissuade their
employees from unions. Fournier, 86 N.L.R.B. 397 (1949) ; Jasper Blackburn
Products Corp., 21 N.L.R.B. 1240 (1940). This threat has also been used to create
a hostile union atmosphere in a community which feared loss of a productive
industry. Regal Shirt Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 567 (1937).
22. Wagner Act, supra note 4. This statute recognizes these union rights.
49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended by 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1959).
23. Supra note 19.
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where between the two extremes. As the ensuing discussion will illustrate,
courts and legislatures have attempted to resolve the controversy by find-
ing just such a middle road which will protect the interests of both.
C.
The Runaway Shop at Common Law.
At common law, neither employees nor unions had any rights in
regard to the location of the employer's business. 24 Consequently, em-
ployers, could, and would, prevent unionization by relocating their busi-
nesses in distant communities.2 5 As a preventative measure against this
practice, unions sought to incorporate "no relocation" clauses in their
collective bargaining agreements, but this device did not always prove
satisfactory. Beside the initial difficulty in obtaining an employer's consent
to limit his right to relocate, the unions were confronted with the problem
of securing an adequate remedy when an employer violated such a pro-
vision.26  The Massachusetts' court thought so little of such a contract
that an employer was permitted to escape his obligations under it by
merely reincorporating."7 The court reasoned that, since corporations are
distinct legal -entities, the new corporation was not bound by a contract
the union made with the old corporation, despite the fact that the new
entity was merely the alter ego of the old.28  Of course, unions have
not always been subject to such distorted reasoning in their contract
actions.2 A Pennsylvania court indicated that, in exercise of its equitable
jurisdiction, it might order an employer to refrain from setting up his
business in another part of the state when such a move constituted a vio-
lation of a collective bargaining agreement. 30 However, the court did cast
doubt upon its authority to order the employer to return to his old loca-
tion.81 The New York Equity Courts, though, were not so reluctant to make
affirmative decrees, 82 and in one case an employer was ordered to return
24. 34 TEMP. L.Q. 136 (1961); 5 W. Rs. L. Rxv. 84 (1953); 41 COLUM. L.
Rzv. 329 (1941).
25. For instance, an employer moved from New York to Virginia in a success-
ful escape from a union shop. S. & K. Knee Pants Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 940 (1937).
26. The natural resort of a union was to equity, in an attempt to obtain
specific performance. 5 W. Rxs. L. REv. 84 (1953) ; 50 HARV. L. Rrv. 700 (1937).
27. Berry v. Old South Engraving Co., 283 Mass. 441, 186 N.E. 601 (1933).
28. Ibid. The court, rejecting the union's request that the corporate veil be
pierced, held that the employer's motive for reincorporating was immaterial. It seems
the court did not feel that fraud could be practiced on a union.
29. Under a more realistic view of the situation, employers have not been
permitted to escape their obligations to a union by reincorporating. NLRB v. E. C.
Brown Co., 184 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1950); Goldman v. Rosenzweig, 10 Law & Labor
207 (New York 1928).
30. Goldstein v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 328 Pa. 385, 196
Atl. 43 (1938) (dictum).
31. Ibid. The court's hesitancy appeared to be based on its fear that such
an affirmative order might be inequitable, since it possibly could force the em-
ployer to return to an unprofitable location.
32. They had no doubt of their power to issue affirmative orders to remedy
such collective bargaining agreement violations. Farulla v. Ralph A. Freundlick, Inc.,
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to his original location, after he had moved in violation of a union con-
tract.83
Therefore, at best, the unions had only an unreliable contract defense
against the runaway shop. When they were not armed with a "no re-
location" clause, they were completely vulnerable to this weapon. It was
situations such as this that prompted the enactment of modern labor legis-
lation in order to better protect unions in their capacity as the bargaining
representatives of employees.34
II.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT ENTERS THE PICTURE.
Because some employers had used their superior economic strength
to prevent employees from organizing for bargaining purposes, Congress
in 1935 enacted the National Labor Relations Act to safeguard certain
union rights, and to equalize the bargaining power between labor and
management.3 5 Various anti-union measures of the employer were de-
signated as unfair labor practices,3 6 and the National Labor Relations
Board was established, with exclusive primary jurisdiction,3 7 to handle
violations of the Act.3 8
Although the runaway shop is not expressly considered by the
NLRA,3 9 the Board has found that this device may fall under three separate
unfair labor practices prohibited by Section 8 of the Act.40 Relocation
intended to frustrate unionization has been held to violate the employees'
right to organize guaranteed by Section 7,41 and hence constitutes an unfair
labor practice under Section 8(a) (1)42 which prohibits employer inter-
ference with these rights. When the move results in a discharge of
152 Misc. 761, 274 N.Y. Supp. 70 (Sup. Ct. 1934) ; 155 Misc. 262, 279 N.Y. Supp. 228
(Sup. Ct. 1935); Goldman v. Wile Importing Co., 10 Law & Labor 207 (New York
Sup. Ct. 1928).
, 33. Dubinsky v. Blue Dale Dress Co., 162 Misc. 177, 292 N.Y. Supp. 898
(Sup. Ct. 1936). Here, the employer had moved from New York to Pennsylvania
in violation of a union contract.
34. 50 CoLum. L. Rzv. 1123, 1124 (1950).
35. This is the express policy of the Act, as found in Section 1 of the Wagner
Act, supra note 4.
36. Section 8(a) of the Act lists five unfair labor practices for which an em-
ployer may be liable. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended by 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 158(a) (1)-(5) (1959).
37. These practices can only be remedied through the machinery provided by
the Act, that is, by the NLRB. Local 586, UAW v. Federal Pacific Electric Co.,
28 CCH Lab. Cas. fr 69,274 (D.C. Conn. 1955); Textile Workers Union v. Arista
Mills Co., 193 F.2d 529 (4th Cir. 1951).
38. Ibid.
39. 34 Ttmp. L.Q. 136 (1961).
40. NLRB v. Wallick, 198 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1952); Rome Products Co.,
77 N.L.R.B. 1217 (1948).
41. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended by 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §157
(1959) ; see also Klotz, 13 N.L.R.B. 746 (1939).
42. Supra note 36; see also New Madrid Mfg. Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 117 (1953);
S. & K. Knee Pants Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 940 (1937).
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employees, it has been found to be illegal under Section 8(a) (3) 3
since that section precludes employer discrimination toward unions in
hiring or tenure of employment. Finally, if an employer changes location
to escape bargaining with a union, he violates his obligation to bargain in
good faith under Section 8(a) (5) .44 The Board, moreover, has held that
not only actual relocation may be prohibited by the NLRA, but also
the threat of relocation as well.4 5 These interpretations of the Act by the
NLRB, which make the runaway shop an unfair labor practice, have
usually been subsequently approved by the Federal Courts. 46
However, even though the NLRA prohibits the runaway shop, this
does-not mean that every relocation by an employer is forbidden. Congress
did* not intend to clothe the NLRB with managerial authority, and so
employers still retain their normal management prerogatives under the
Act.4 7 These prerogatives are restricted only when management uses
them as anti-union weapons.48 Therefore, an employer is still free to
relocate as long as his move is not intended to impede union organization,
to discourage activities of an -xisting union, or to avoid collective bargain-
ing; when an employer acts with one of those motives, relocation becomes
a runaway shop and falls within the prohibitions of the Act.4 9 Thus, it is
the purpose or intended result of the relocation that constitutes the unfair
labor practice, and not the act of moving itself.50 Consequently, relocation
which is not motivated by hostile union reasons, still remains outside NLRB
jurisdiction.51
III.
WHEN Is A RELOCATED SHOP A "RUNAWAY"?
A.
Requisite Intent.
The general rule is that relocations which are undertaken for eco-
nomic or personal reasons are valid, while those that are prompted by
43. Supra note 36; see also Winchester Electronics, Inc., 128 N.L.R.B. 1292
(1960) ; Diaper Jean Mfg. Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1045 (1954).
44. Supra note 36; see also Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc., 108 N.L.RB.
1369 (1954); Schieber Millinery Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 937 (1940).
45. Jasper Blackburn Products Corp., 21 N.L.R.B. 1240 (1940) - Friedman-
Harry Marks Clothing Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 411 (1936).
46. Gerity Whitaker Co., 33 N.L.R.B. 393 (1941), af'd, 137 F.2d 198 (6th
Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 801, 63 Sup. Ct. 827 (1943); NLRB v. Wallick,
198 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1952); NLRB v. Schieber, 116 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1940);
NLRB v. Hopwood Retinning Co., 98 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1938).
47. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 61 Sup. Ct. 845 (1941) ; NLRB
v. Union Pacific Stages, 99 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1938).
48. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct. 615 (1937).
49 50 COLUM. L. Rgv. 1123 (1950); 5 W. Rzs. L. Rzv. 84 (1953).
50. NLRB v. Grower-Shipper Vegetable Ass'n, 122 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1941) ; 11
VAND. L. Rzv. 635 (1958).
51. When the employer can show justification for his move the NLRB will
not interfere. Krantz Wire & Mfg. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 971 (1952); Fiss Corp., 43
N.L.R.B. 125 (1942).
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anti-union motives are prohibited.5 2  This rule, though simple to state,
is often not easy to apply due to the difficulty inherent in discover-
ing actual intent.58 Of course, where an employer offers no reason for
his relocation, it has been held that the NLRB may presume an anti-union
intent, since his motivation lies exclusively within his own knowledge.54
However, normally the employer will rebut this presumption by offering
some justification for his move, and thereby place the onus on the Board
to disprove his assertions. 5
Employers may be able to validly justify relocations on the grounds
that the new site provides lower plant rentals, less taxes, better markets,
cheaper material and labor, or other economic benefit. 56 Also, moves have
been deemed valid when made for expansion purposes, or to escape an
unprofitable location. 57 Another acceptable basis for relocating has been
personal necessity, such as poor health. 58 However, merely alleging these
reasons is not sufficient to obtain Board approval. The NLRB must decide
whether these contentions are in accord with the employer's conduct.5 9
In some cases the employer has refuted his own claims by a prior ad-
mission that the move was designed to combat the union.60 In the absence
of any such imprudent statements, the Board must turn to circumstances
surrounding the relocation in order to determine actual motivation. 61 A
runaway shop may be indicated by various factors, such as threats of re-
moval,6 2 anti-union statements, 6 3 refusal to honor a union contract,6 4 and
52. A move to thwart a union is a runaway. Schieber Millinery Co., 26 N.L.R.B.
937 (1940); but a relocation that is prompted by economic and health reasons is
valid. Krantz Wire & Mfg. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 971 (1952); 34 TimP. L.Q. 136(1961); 5 W. REs. L. Rzv. 84 (1953); 41 COLUM. L. Rv. 329 (1941).
53. Martel Mills Corp. v. NLRB, 114 F.2d 624 (4th Cir. 1940); 50 COLUM.
L. Rzv. 1123 (1950).
54. NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1938); 5 W. Rgs. L.
REv. 84 (1953).
55. Martell Mills Corp. v. NLRB, 114 F.2d 624 (4th Cir. 1940).
56. Diaper Jean Mfg. Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1045 (1954); Brown Truck & Trailer
Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999 (1953) ; Trenton Garment Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 1186 (1938);
Admin. decision of the General Counsel, 1960 CCH NLRB ff 9417.
57. Krantz Wire & Mfg. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 971 (1952); Auto Stove Works,
81 N.L.R.B. 1203 (1949); Fiss Corp., 43 N.L.R.B. 125 (1942); also, the employer
can bargain about such matters, NLRB v. Lion Shoe Co., 97 F.2d 448 (1st Cir.
1938).
58. NLRB v. Lewis, 246 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1957).
59. 50 COLUM. L. REv. 1123 (1950).
60. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 212 (1960); Gerity Whitaker Co., 33
N.L.R.B. 393 (1941)1 Schieber Millinery Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 937 (1940). Contra.
Mount Hope Finishing Co. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1954), reversing 106
N.L.R.B. 480 (1953).
61. 50 COLUM. L. R'v. 1123 (1950). Often the sequence of events surrounding
the move is determinative. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 212 (1960) ; S. & K.
Knee Pants Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 940 (1937).
62. NLRB v. Hopwood Retinning Cb., 98 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1938); New
Madrid Mfg. Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 117 (1953).
63. Rome Products Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1217 (1948); S. & K. Knee Pants Co.,
2 N.L.R.B. 940 (1937). Anti-union statements alone might not be sufficient to
prove a runaway, but they can be when combined with other hostile union acts.
5 W. Rzs. L. Rrv. 84 (1953).
64. NLRB v. Lewis, 246 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1957); Klotz, 13 N.L.R.B. 746(1939).
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other hostile union activities prior or subsequent to relocation.5 Lack
of economic gain by the move also points toward a runaway.6 6 In general,
if the employer gives inconsistent or contradictory reasons for his relocation,
it creates a suspicion that his move was unlawful, and this suspicion be-
comes conclusive if accompanied by anti-union conduct.0 7
Perhaps the most important consideration in determining if a re-
location is justifiable, is whether good faith bargaining has taken place.
Failure to give notice to a union of a contemplated move may, in itself, be
an unfair labor practice,6 8 as well as a strong indication of whether the
move was also a runaway. Hence, relocations which are secret or based
on bad faith bargaining are likely to be found illegal. 9 On the other hand,
if the employer makes full disclosure and is willing to bargain in good
faith, the move will more likely be held valid. 0 The vital importance of
good faith bargaining is clearly illustrated by the results in two cases. In
the Levy case,71 an employer's good faith bargaining, which led to an
impasse, was held to justify his relocation, even though there had been
a history of hostile union activity and a threat to relocate prior to the
bargaining. Yet, in NLRB v. Lezis,72 an employer's move, which other-
wise would have been permissible because of health reasons, was found
to be an unfair labor practice since he refused to bargain about it.
B.
Dual Motivation Cases.
The runaway shop cases depict a wide spectrum of possible employer
intentions underlying a move, ranging from purely economical to solely
anti-union.73 Where the evidence shows motivation at either extreme, the
Board has little trouble in reaching a decision. 74 However, as the issue of
65. NLRB v. Wallick, 198 F.2d 447 (3d Cir. 1952) (anti-union activity
following the move); Robinson, 2 N.L.R.B. 460 (1936) (hostile union inquisition
prior to the move).
66. Omaha Hat Corp., 4 N.L.R.B. 878 (1938); 41 COLUM. L. Ri. 329 (1941).
Sufficient personal motives may rebut this.
67. Diaper Jean Mfg. Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1045 (1954).
68. Ibid.; Sidele Fashions, Inc., 1961 CCH N.L.R.B. r 10,436; Brown Truck
& Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999 (1953); Brown-McLaren Mfg. Co., 34
N.L.R.B. 984 (1941). But see, Mount Hope Finishing Co. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d
365 (4th Cir. 1954). The old rule appeared to be that the employer did not have
to notify the union, but today it would seem such notice is required. 11 VAND. L. Rrv.
635 (1958) ; 5 W. Rzs. L. Rzv. 84 (1953).
69. NLRB v. Cape County Milling Co., 140 F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1944) ; Diaper Jean
Mfg. Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1045 (1954); Rome Products Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1217
(1948); Schieber Millinery Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 937 (1940); but failure to bargain
does not always mean a runaway will be found. Mount Hope Finishing Co. v.
NLRB, 211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1954) ; Brown Truck & Trailer Mfg. Co., 106
N.L.R.B. 999 (1953); Brown-McLaren Mfg. Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 984 (1941).
70. Kipbea Baking Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 56 (1961); Auto Stove Works, 81
N.L.R.B. 1203 (1949).
71. 24 N.L.R.B. 786 (1940).
72. 246 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1957).
73. Diaper Jean Mfg. Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1045 (1954).
74. Krantz Wire & Mfg. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 971 (1952) (move valid); In the
Matter of Robinson, 2 N.L.R.B. 460 (1936) (move runaway).
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intent nears the middle of the spectrum, resolution of the cases becomes
increasingly difficult. When there are almost equal economic and anti-
union reasons for the move, the Board is confronted with the problem
of dual motivation. Generally, it is held that economic justification cannot
be used to validate anti-union purposes, which are also involved in the
move.75 For instance, in Rapid Bindery,76 the NLRB, after conceding
that there was economic motivation, still held that the move was a runaway
since there was also a hostile union intent present. However, the Board's
decisions have not been entirely consistent in this area. In Trenton
Garment,7 there was strong evidence that a move resulted from hostile
union sentiments, as well as vital business considerations. The relocation
was upheld because the employer had made a clear showing that he could
no longer profitably remain in business at his old location, although it
was noted that the employer's anti-union activities did create an air
of suspicion about the move.
There is one type of dual motivation case that has proved extremely
troublesome. This occurs when the economic and anti-union motivation
are so interrelated as to become indistinguishable. In these cases the
union's demands have made the employer's present location unprofitable,
so that he is forced to move to a more economical site. The economic
intent behind the move must of necessity include the intent to escape the
union. In one case the Board permitted relocation when the union had
refused to bargain about the disadvantageous competitive position it had
forced upon the employer. 78 However, where there is no showing of such
union intransigeance, the NLRB has not been sympathetic to the hard
pressed employer. In this situation employers have been forced to resort
to the courts to obtain a more sympathetic understanding. For example, in
Mount Hope Finishing Co.,7 9 an employer had moved from his unprofitable
location where labor troubles had developed. The Board found the relo-
cation to be a runaway, placing stress on the fact that -the employer had
publicly stated that the move was undertaken to escape the union. The
Fourth Circuit reversed,80 holding that since the old location was un-
profitable before the labor difficulties arose, it was even more so after the
union exerted economic pressure. The Court felt it inequitable to require
an employer to remain at an unprofitable location in the face of union
demands that made the site even less desirable. Therefore, the hostile moti-
vation was ignored. In another reversal of a similar Board decision,81 the
Sixth Circuit gave a different and perhaps more logical rationale. An em-
75. California Footwear Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 765 (1955); Tennessee-Carolina
Transp., Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 1369 (1954); Klotz, 13 N.L.R.B. 746 (1939).
76. 127 N.L.R.B. 212 (1960).
77. 4 N.L.R.B. 1186 (1938).
78. Brown-McLaren Mfg. Co., 34 N.LR.B. 984 (1941).
79. 106 N.L.R.B. 480 (1953), res/d 211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1954).
80. Ibid.
81. NLRB v. Adkins Transfer Co., 226 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1955), reversing 109
N.L.R.B. 956 (1954).
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ployer had shut down one of his departments because union wage rates made
continued operation unprofitable. The court reasoned that employee mem-
bership in the union and the union wage demands were only incidental to
the basic motivation of economic necessity. Therefore, it was held that
economics, and not hostile union intent, prompted the shutdown.
However, the NLRB still does not appear to be convinced by such
reasoning. In another recent case, Sidele Fashions Inc.,8 2 the Board, after
finding that relocation followed onerous wage demands by the union,
held that the move was a runaway. Though this decision seems question-
able in the light of the two cases discussed above, there are two dis-
tinguishable features. First, the union was apparently willing to continue to
abide by the old contract, under which the employer could make a profit,
without threatening economic action to force him to accept the new one.
Secondly, the employer used the possibility of reopening his old plant as
a lever to force the union into making concessions. Yet, a Federal Court
might still take a dim view of the NLRB's finding, if called upon to re-
view the decision.
In this regard, it should be recalled that courts have but limited
power to review Board decisions.83 It is for the Board, and not courts,
to decide any fact issues involved in the question of intent.8 4 Where
there is evidence of dual motivation, the Board must determine which,
if either, dominates.8 5 If the Board holds that one of two possible intents
was the actual impetus for a relocation, the courts should uphold such
a finding, provided they are supported by substantial evidence.8 " A judicial
finding of fact should rarely be imposed upon that of the Board,8 7 although
some courts are inclined to do just that.88 A mere suspicion of an
unfair labor practice, however, is not sufficient to sustain a Board de-
cision to that effect.89
C.
Reincorporation.
Employers often seek to conceal the existence of a runaway shop
through reincorporation. When accused of instituting a runaway shop,
82. 1961 CCH NLRB 10,436.
83. Williams Motor Co. v. NLRB, 128 F.2d 960 (8th Cir. 1942); 34 TEMP.
L.Q. 136 (1961).
84. The court lacks jurisdiction over unfair labor practice questions. Textile
Workers Union v. Arista Mills Co., 193 F.2d 529 (4th Cir. 1951).
85. Supra note 72.
86. NLRB v. Wallick, 198 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1952); NLRB v. Somerset Classics,
193 F.2d 613 (2d Cir. 1952).
87. The court will uphold the Board, even though it might have reached a
different result if it had ruled on the facts. NLRB v. Cape County Milling Co., 140
F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1944).
88. Cf. Mount Hope Finishing Co. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1954);
NLRB v. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co., 211 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1954).89. Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. NLRB, 98 F.2d 758 (2nd Cir. 1938);
Diaper Jean Mfg. Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1045 (1954).
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the corporation's defense is that there is a distinction between the corporate
entities at the old and new location.90 If this defense is to fail, the
old and new corporations must be recognized as a single legal entity.9 '
This the Board has done, with court approval,92 by disregarding the
corporate fiction in order to reach the real party in interest.93 It has
disposed of the employer's argument by holding that different corporate
entities cannot be used to frustrate the purposes of the Act.94 Of course,
where there is a distinction between the two corporate entities in fact,
as well as form, this becomes a valid defense.95 Therefore, the Board
must determine whether the new corporation is merely the alter ego of
the old, or a separate and distinct legal entity.
This presents another fact question to be decided by the NLRB,
and the answer, once again, must be gleaned from all the surrounding
circumstances.96 Naturally, the new corporation becomes suspect where
the old corporation shutdown immediately followed unionization,97 or when
the employer showed a hostile attitude toward unions,98 or was guilty
of anti-union activities.9" However, before the new corporation can be
found to be the alter ego of the old, it also must be shown that there
is an inter-relationship between the two. This is done by demonstrating
the similarity of control over both, such as the same stock ownership.100
Intra-family control of the two corporations has also been used to support
a finding that one is merely the alter ego of the other, 011 but this alone
may not be conclusive.10 2 Other factors that have influenced the Board
are similarity in management, 0 3 non-union employees,' 0 4 or customers. 0 5
Also, the fact that the new corporation's operations are integrated with
the old,'06 or that it is under-capitalized, 10 7 indicate that only a dummy
corporation has been created. In essence then, the test again is whether
good faith was present when the new corporation was created.
90. Rome Products Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1217 (1948).
91. 50 COLUM. L. Rv. 1123 (1950).
92. NLRB v. E. C. Brown Co., 184 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1950); NLRB v. Hopwood
Retinning Co., 98 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1938).
93. Schieber Millinery Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 937 (1940).
94. Ibid.
95. Mount Hope Finishing Co. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1954); Kipbea
Baking Co., 131 N.L.R.B. No. 56 (1961).
96. 5 W. Ris. L. Rlv. 84 (1953).
97. NLRB v. E. C. Brown Co., 184 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1950).
98. Rome Products Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1217 (1948).
99. Schieber Millinery Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 937 (1940).
100. C. & D. Coal Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 799 (1951).
101. NLRB v. Somerset Classics, 193 F.2d 613 (2d Cir. 1952); Gerity Whitaker,
33 N.L.R.B. 393 (1942).
102. Mount Hope Finishing Co. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1954);
Kipbea Baking Co., 131 N.L.R.B. No. 56 (1961).
103. Rome Products Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1217 (1948).
104. NLRB v. E. C. Brown Co., 184 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1950).
105. C. & D. Coal Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 799 (1951); 50 CoLuM. L. Rzv. 1123
(1950).
106. NLRB v. Somerset Classics, 193 F.2d 613 (2d Cir. 1952).
107. 50 CoLuM. L. Rxv. 1123 (1950).
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Closely akin to the formation of a new corporation is a sale of
the business. The employer may attempt to disguise his runaway by
claiming that the business has been sold to a new owner.108 The Board
must then determine if the sale is bona fide, and if control of the busi-
ness has really been divorced from the old owner. 10 9 As with reincorpora-
tion, the Board must view the entire picture in order to discover whether
this defense is valid.
IV.
RELOCATION AS A SUBJECT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING.
The failure of an employer to notify the union representing his
employees about a planned relocation not only indicates a runaway shop,110
but also is an unfair labor practice in itself."' A secret move is a violation
of the employer's duty to bargain, under Section 8(a) (5).112 This duty
is in no way lessened by the fact that relocation is prompted by legitimate,
rather than anti-union motives.118 Thus, even if the NLRB finds that
the secrecy of the move is not sufficient evidence of a runaway shop,
the employer's failure to give notice will sustain the finding of an unfair
labor practice."14
Once an employer has provided notification, the burden is upon
the union to initiate bargaining concerning the impending move.11 5 If
the union fails to request bargaining, it may be precluded from later
alleging that the employer's move was an unfair labor practice. 1 6 Naturally,
if the union does demand bargaining prior to the move, the employer
must negotiate the relocation in good faith.117 This does not mean that
the employer's plans are at the mercy of the union since the union can-
not flatly refuse to approve an employer's validly motivated move. 18
If a legitimate impasse in bargaining is reached, the employer may re-
locate, regardless of union objections." 9 Also, it has been held that
an employer can refuse to discuss the transfer of his business if the
108. Where there is an absence of good faith and only a nominal change in
ownership, the move is easily labeled a runaway. 41 COLUM. L. Rzv. 329 (1941).
109. The Board will not hold the move a runaway where there is bona fide
sale and divorce of ownership. New Madrid Mfg. Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 117 (1953).110. The effect that lack of notification has in determining whether a runaway
shop has occurred has been previously discussed in Section III A.
111. Diaper Jean Mfg. Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1045 (1954); Rome Products Co.,
77 N.L.R.B. 1217 (1948); Schieber Millinery Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 937 (1940); 11
VAND. L. Rxv. 635 (1958).
112. Ibid.
113. Brown Truck and Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999 (1953); Diaper
Jean Mfg. Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1045 (1954).
114. Ibid.
115. Kipbea Baking Co., 131 N.L.R.B. No. 56 (1961); Auto Stove Works, 81
N.L.R.B. 1203 (1949).
116. Ibid.
117. Levy, 24 N.L.R.B. 786 (1940).
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid.
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union takes an unreasonable bargaining position, e.g., insistence on a
contract which makes the employer's present location unprofitable.
120
When the Board finds an unfair labor practice under Section 8(a) (5)
because of an employer's failure to bargain prior to a move, it may
order the employer to commence bargaining to arrange transfer of his
old employees to the new site.12 ' If this solution is impractical, the
employer may simply be required to place his old employees on a prefer-
ential hiring list at the new location. 122 Further, where employees at
the old site would have moved with the employer had he bargained
prior to the move, the employer may be ordered to recognize the old union
as bargaining representative at the new site, without requiring proof
that it has majority support there. 2
Although an employer can bargain about his move when his present
location is unprofitable, 1 24 relocation is not always a proper subject of
collective bargaining. Once an employer has decided to move, he must
notify and bargain with the union. 25 This does not mean he can use
the possibility of relocation to force onerous conditions upon a union.'2 6
In the former situation the employer is informing the union concerning
a management decision about which it has a right to know; in the latter
case he is attempting to coerce.127 An employer's threat of relocation
or plant shutdown because of union activities is an attempt to coerce em-
ployees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7, and is
an unfair labor practice under Section 8(a) (1).128 Of course, an em-
ployer's statement that he might relocate can only be construed to be
an unfair labor practice when it was prompted by anti-union motivation.
129
It is perhaps easier to establish anti-union motivation behind a threat
of relocation than with actual relocation, since the threat is normally
made with direct reference to some particular union activity.'8 0 For in-
stance, a declaration that an employer might relocate during a union
organization drive, has been held to be an illegal threat.18 '
120. Brown-McLaren Mfg. Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 984 (1941). Even though the
employer was not obligated to discuss the transfer of his business, he was held
to have committed an unfair labor practice under Section 8(a)(5) because he had
refused to bargain about the transfer of employees who were laid off at the old site.
121. Brown Truck and Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999 (1953).
122. Brown-McLaren Mfg. Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 984 (1941).
123. NLRB v. Lewis, 246 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1957); 11 VAND. L. Rzv. 635(1958).
124. NLRB v. Lion Shoe Co., 97 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1938).
125. NLRB v. Lewis, 246 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1957); Brown Truck and Trailer
Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999 (1953).
126. Admin. Decision of the General Counsel, 1960 CCH NLRB 9429 (1960).
127. While a good faith shutdown of a .plant is valid, the threat to close down
is an unfair labor practice. Atlas Underware Co. v. NLRB, 116 F.2d 1020 (6th
Cir. 1941); NLRB v. Asheville Hosiery Co., 108 F.2d 288 (4th Cir. 1939).
128. NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 411 (1936),
revd 85 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1936), enforced 301 U.S. 58, 57 Sup. Ct. 645 (1937);
NLRB v. Clark, 176 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1949) ; Jasper Blackburn Products Corp., 21
N.L.R.B. 1240 (1940); Regal Shirt Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 567 (1938).
129. 2 CCH Lab. L. Rep. 3795 (1961).
130. Ibid.
131. Robinson, 2 N.L.R.B. 460 (1936).
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However, an employer's statement that he might relocate, without
more, is protected as privileged free speech under Section 8(c) of the
Act. 3 2 That section provides that expression of views, opinions and
arguments not coercive in nature, does not constitute a violation of
the NLRA. 133 . Thus, while a proposal of relocation is a threat when
directed at some particular union activity, coercive intent does not seem
as certain when the relocation is proposed at the bargaining table. For
example, if an employer felt that acceptance of a union's wage demands
would make his present location unprofitable, he might counter that
the union's insistence on its position would force him to consider re-
locating. The employer's statement under those conditions is more likely
intended to be informative, rather than coercive, and therefore protected
under Section 8(c). Further, the union would certainly prefer to know
what results might follow if it persists in its demands. Yet, the danger
remains that employers will use the possibility of relocation as a coercive
bargaining weapon to force unions to submit to demands. In a very
recent case the NLRB articulated this concern in holding that an em-
ployer violated Sections 8(a) (1) and (5) when relocation was used as
a bargaining lever to force union concessions, even though there were
economic justifications for a move.134 Therefore, an employer is on
tenuous ground when raising the possibility of relocation at the bargain-
ing table, since the Board may well construe this as an illegal threat.
Yet, if the employer meets the test of good faith and offers the proposal
with informative rather than with coercive intent, this should be con-
sidered a proper subject of collective bargaining.
V. I
REMEDIES FOR THE RUNAWAY SHOP.
When a potential runaway shop is still but a threat by the employer,
the Board can easily provide a satisfactory remedy. Under the authority
granted by Section 10(c) of the Act, 3 5 the employer is ordered to "cease
and desist" such an unfair labor 'practice. 8 6 Once the threat has been
carried out, the Board is confronted by a more complex problem in formu-
lating a remedy.13 7 Generally the NLRB, by its remedial power, at-
tempts to restore the status quo, as it existed before the unfair labor
practice occurred.' 38 Therefore, the most direct solution for the runaway
132. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended 61 Stat. 140 (1949), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c)
(1959).
133. Ibid.
134. Sidele Fashions, Inc., 1961 CCH NLRB § 10,436 (1961).
135. 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended 61 Stat. 146 (1949), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)(1959).
136. NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., I N.L.R.B. 411 (1936),
rev'd 85 F2,d 1 (2d Cir. 1936), enforced 301 U.S. 58, 57 Sup. Ct. 645 (1937).
137. 2 CCH Lab. L. Rep. 1 3795 (1961).
138. Schieber Millinery Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 937 (1940); Klotz, 13 N.L.R.B. 746(1939); 41 COLUM. L. Rxv. 329 (1941).
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shop problem would seem to be an order that the employer return to
the old location. The Board has power to do so, at least theoretically,189
under Section 10(c),140 which vests authority in the Board to take such
affirmative action "as will effectuate the policies of the Act." Yet, the
NLRB has never issued such an order without giving the alternative
of remaining at the new site and paying the transportation expenses of
the old employees who wish to be reinstated there.1 4 1 In a few cases,
reinstatement alone has been the remedy, with no mention of any re-
quirement to return, or of transportation expenses to be paid.1 42 How-
ever, in each of these cases it appeared that the employer's new location
was in the same area as the old. 143 In another case, the Board ordered
the employer either to pay his employees' total cost of moving to the
new location, or else reimburse them for twice a week commuting ex-
penses to their old homes.' 44  Peculiar circumstances involved in that
case seem to account for the departure from the normal alternative remedy
solution.' 45 The circuit courts have been quite willing to enforce the
alternative remedies ordered by the Board.' 46 In one case the court re-
fused to enforce an order requiring an employer to pay employees' trans-
portation expenses to a new location,1 47 but that litigation did not involve
a true runaway shop situation.' 48
There are a number of reasons why the NLRB has adopted the
alternative remedy approach, rather than simply ordering a return to
the old location. The Board has recognized the burdens forced on an
employer who is required to return.149 Also, it is aware of the Supreme
Court's admonition that a reinstatement order should be framed so as
to cause as little dislocation of an employer's business as possible. 50
Another possible explanation is that some return orders would have a dis-
ruptive effect on interstate commerce.' 5 ' In any event, the NLRB has
139. Although some have stated that such an order is within the power of the
Board, others have voiced doubt as to this. Since the Board has never issued such
an order the question remains moot. 53 MicE. L. Rzv. 627 (1955); 5 W. Rls.
L. RUv. 84 (1953) ; 50 COLUm. L. Rzv. 1123 (1950).
140. 29 U.S.C. § 160 supra note 135.
141. 2 CCH Lab. L. Rep. 1 3795.50 (1961).
142. NLRB v. Hopwood Retinning Co., 98 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1938); Omaha
Hat Corp., 4 N.L.R.B. 878 (1938); Robinson, 2 N.L.R.B. 460 (1936).
143. Ibid. In each of these cases the move was from New York City to New
Jersey.
144. Klotz, 13 N.L.R.B. 746 (1939).
145. Ibid. The Board stated that it would not order the employer back be-
cause the union did not request it, and such an order would cause the employees at
the new site to lose their jobs. It gave the option of commuting or moving because
it felt that some employees would not want to live at the new site. In the New
Madrid Mfg. Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 117 (1953), the Board specifically rejected the
trial examiner's recommendation of a similar remedy.
146. NLRB v. Wallick, 198 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1952); NLRB v. Schieber, 116
F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1940).
147. NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1938). -
148. Klotz, 13 N.L.R.B. 746 (1939) This is the distinction offered by the Board.
149. Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 1369 (1954).
150. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 61 Sup. Ct. 845 (1941);
Williams Motor Co. v. NLRB, 128 F.2d 960 (8th Cir. 1942); Mooresville Cotton
Mills v. NLRB, 97 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1938).
151. 53 MIcH. L. Rgv. 627 (1955).
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evidently determined that giving the employer an option to bring his
employees to his new site is just as feasible as ordering him back to his
old location.152
Besides all the practical reasons the Board may have for not
simply ordering a return, the strongest deterrent against this remedy is
probably the fact that the NLRB is not certain of its power in this area.
While the affirmative power given the Board by Section 10(c) is stated
in the broadest of terms, the courts have not given this section a literal
reading. Rather, the NLRB's- affirmative power has repeatedly been
held to be solely remedial, and does not extend to the issuance of orders
which are punitive in nature. 53  Although no court has held that a
direct order for an employer to return to his old location is punitive, it
might be so found. 154 Indeed the NLRB itself has held that such an
order would be punitive, and beyond its authority to issue. 5 5
Despite this, the case law in this area is vague enough that a
good argument could be made in favor of the validity of a simple return
order. 156 The distinction between remedial and punitive orders has never
been too clear. Obviously, there are some cases where the Board's order
has been plainly punitive,157 but the dividing line is not always de-
lineated.' 58 Even though it has been suggested that the distinction must
be made in order to avoid a due process problem, 5 9 there seems to be
some justification for the criticism that its chief purpose is merely to
give courts a peg on which to fasten a decision. 60 The courts seem to have
used this test in order to subject the Board's orders to the test of reason-
ableness ;161 thus, when the court feels the Board's order imposes a harsh
and unreasonable burden on the employer, it labels the order punitive and
strikes it down. Therefore, it would seem that in cases, where an un-
reasonable burden was not imposed, an employer could be ordered to
return to his old location.
152. Schieber Millinery Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 937 (1940); Another explanation that
has been offered is that the Board might feel hesitant to impose such a harsh remedy
when complex motives underlie the move. 5 W. Rss. L. Rv. 84 (1953).
153. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 61 Sup. Ct. 77 (1940);
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 59 Sup. Ct. 206 (1938); NLRB v.
Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1938).
154. 34 TEMP. L.Q. 136 (1961); 53 MicH. L. Rv. 627 (1955); 5 W. Rs.
L. Rxv. 84 (1953).
155. However, the Board had previously implied that it did have the power to
issue such an order, Klotz, 13 N.L.R.B. 746 (1939).
156. The Courts have recognized that the Board should have wide discretion in
exercising its remedial powers in order to effectuate the policies of the Act. Con-
solidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 59 Sup. Ct. 206 (1938); NLRB
v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 261, 58 Sup. Ct. 571 (1938); Williams
Motor Co. v. NLRB, 128 F.2d 960 (8th Cir. 1942). Also see Phelps Dodge Corp.
v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177, 61 Sup. Ct. 845 (1941).
157. When the Board's order is clearly in the nature of a fine, there is no
doubt but that it is punitive and beyond its power. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB,
311 U.S. 7, 61 Sup. Ct. 77 (1940).
158. 89 U. PA. L. Rav. 648, 655 (1941).
159. Ibid.
160. Ibid.
161. 2 CCH Lab. L. Rep. J 3795 (1961); 1939 Wis. L. REv. 445.
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Apparently this is the view of those members of the Board who
have been dissenting from the alternative remedy solution.1 6 2 They have
argued that giving the employer the option to remain at the new loca-
tion does not really accomplish the desired end of restoring the status
quo.16 3  It has been pointed out that such a remedy often places the
employees in a burdensome position,164 and actually allows an employer
to escape with the fruits of his unfair labor practice.16 5 This was graphically
illustrated by the Tennessee-Carolina Transportation case.'6 6 There, the
employer committed an unfair labor practice by transferring his office op-
erations to another city. The alternative remedy solution was ordered.
Board Member Murdock, strongly dissenting, asserted that the only effec-
tive remedy would be to order the employer to return to his old location.
He noted that the employer himself admitted that he knew most of
his employees would not move to the new location because of family ties.
Therefore, permitting the employer to remain at his new site meant
that in effect the unfair labor practice was left unremedied, contrary to
the statutory mandate of the Act.16 7 There is no denying the fact that
in cases such as this, the alternative remedy may well allow the employer
to reap the benefits of his illegal act.
VI.
SUMMARY.
The NLRB, in its pursuit of the runaway shop, has encountered two
major roadblocks. The first occurs when there is dual motivation present
with a relocation. In such a situation, the Board adopts the view that
the move constitutes a runaway. This position seems proper, since an
illegal action cannot be made legal because it is also accompanied by
legitimate motivation. However, there are practical factors which may
justify exceptions to this general principle. When economic survival neces-
sitates the move, an employer should be allowed to relocate, even though
anti-union motivation is also present. If an employer is required to re-
main at an unprofitable location, his only alternative may be to go out
of business. Such a result would serve the interests of neither labor nor
management. Of course, to prevent abuse of this exception, the employer
should be required to make a clear showing that economic necessity ab-
solutely demanded that he relocate. Perhaps this requirement of proof
should be lessened where it can be demonstrated that the union's unreason-
162. Dissents to the alternative remedy solution by Board members can be found in
the following cases: Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 1369 (1954);
Williams Motor Co., 31 N.L.R.B. 715 (1941); Schieber Millinery Co., 26 N.L.R.B.
937 (1940).
163. Ibid.
164. Ibid.
165. Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 1369 (1954).
166. Ibid.
167. Ibid. The majority in this case seemed to be influenced by the burden
that would be placed on the employer if he was required to return. However,
Member Murdock pointed out that the employer still had a place of business at the
old relocation, and it would not be too difficult for him to return there.
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able demands forced the employer into his economic predicament. A
rationale, akin to the clean hands doctrine of equity, might be appropriately
applied to a union guilty of such conduct. It would seem only just to dis-
allow a union's complaint about a runaway shop, when the union itself
imposed the onerous conditions which necessitated the move. Unfortunately,
the Board does not always appear willing to give recognition to these
practical factors, but rather seems to favor a more unrealistic theoretical
approach. The courts, in their review of Board decisions, have remedied
this to some extent by adopting a more pragmatic position toward the
employer's economic needs.
The second major obstacle which confronts the Board is that of
devising an effective remedy for the runaway shop. Their alternative
remedy solution has often proved to be an insufficient method of restor-
ing the status quo. By allowing an employer to remain at his new site,
the burden is placed on employees who wish to be reinstated. Even
though the employer is liable for transportation expenses, the employees
still face the hardship of tearing up their roots at the old location if
they are to retain their jobs. Obviously, many will choose to remain at
the place where their homes are established. Under this solution an
employer might very well succeed with the purpose of his runaway shop.
No doubt, such a result encourages employers to indulge in such illegal
conduct, since the risk involved is materially lessened. It is true that
in certain cases a return order might be unreasonable and impractical.
The Board might also feel hesitant about issuing such an order, if the
original move was prompted by dual motivation, rather than just hostile
union intent. In these cases it is quite possible that an alternative remedy
order is the only feasible solution, especially in light of the fact that a
direct order to return in such a situation might be construed as punitive.
However, this does not mean the alternative remedy is proper for
all runaway shop cases. If the burden placed on employees by making
them move is more onerous than that placed on the employer if he is
required to transfer back, an affirmative return order appears to be justi-
fied. In such a case, this would be the most reasonable method for re-
storing the status quo, and therefore, would be remedial in nature rather
than punitive.
Despite the imperfections that might exist in the NLRB's runaway
shop doctrine, it is generally the best solution for the problem created
by relocation. The union's interest of self-preservation is recognized by
prohibiting an employer from using relocation as an anti-union weapon.
At the same time the employer's interest in being free to exercise its
management prerogatives is protected by refusing to interfere with an
employer who moves for legitimate reasons. Thus, the basic theory is
sound, even though its application may at times be subject to question.
John B. Taulane, Jr.
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